IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1124

International Court of Justice

Filed Dec. 7, 1945
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H-1124

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, et al

defendants

D O C U M E N T B O O K

In re: THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS' WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U.S. Chief of Counsel

To be argued by: SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN

Of Counsel:

SIDNEY J. KAPLAN
Commander, USCGR

JAMES A. GORRELL
1st Lieutenant, CMP

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H1124 - 0003

OUTLINE OF ORAL PRESENTATION OF THE CASE CONCERNING THE CONSPIRATOR'S WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

I Introductory.

II The Inception of the Plan.

III Plan Barbarossa.

IV Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of Barbarossa.

V Preparation for Plunder - Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoliation of the U.S.S.R.

VI The Politics of Destruction - Preparation for the Political Phases of the Aggression.

VII The Motives for the Attack.

VIII Conclusion.

H1124 - 0004

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-33
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit USA 133
Filed Dec 10, 1945

EXCERPTS FROM "OPERATIONS BARBAROSSA AND MARITA"

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. 82.

3.2.41.....

8) Proposals for command and organization of operation "Barbarossa".

a) The organization remains intact. Group North has the operational responsibility in the Naval Sphere during operation "Barbarossa".

b) Under the direction of Group North the Flag Officer Cruisers (Bd.K) will, as "Flag Officer Baltic", direct operations for "Barbarossa" from the Command Station Swinemuende.

c) "The Flag Officer Baltic" has under him:

The S.O. Minelayers. Augmenting of the Staff of Flag Officer Baltic by Chief of Staff, Staff of S.O. torpedo boats and the assigning of a staff officer for U boats. For missions of coastal aviation units in the Baltic, Fliegerführer "EAST" is at his disposal.
Flag Officer in Charge Baltic Defences is responsible for the security of passages into the Baltic, the Kattegat and Skayerrak.
The responsibilities for security of the Baltic Station are limited to the sea territory west of the narrows of GJEDSE.

d) For the tasks of organization and defence of the conquered coastal areas the following are to be set up:

Flag Officer (Coastal)	Baltic Coast
Flag Officer (Coastal)	Gulf of Finland

with corresponding sea commandants.

Responsibility for the Arctic Sea Coast is given to the Admiral Polar Coasts.

e) The duties of the Flag Officer Cruisers are to be taken over by the Fleet Command where questions of the fleet forces are concerned and by 2nd Admiral of the fleet where questions of the training squadron are concerned.
The Chief of Naval War Staff agrees to the above.

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op of Page 17.

.2.41

Until the regrouping for "Barbarossa" takes place, efforts must be made to obtain increased activity of air and naval warfare.

Page 97.

8). From a memorandum passed to Ia for information, of an interview of the Commander in Chief of the German Army with the Führer, it becomes clear that with regard to the imminent Marita/Barbarossa operations, the troops in reserve for operation "Felix" will have to be utilized for the new undertaking.
For "MARITA" 6 Panzer divisions are to be held in readiness as a precaution in the event of Turkey's entry into the war.

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS:

.2.41
nday

The Chief of Naval War Staff ordered an inspection of defences in the French aval Bases, in case of internal disturbances caused by sudden attacks from inland y the French. This question was also presented to the Supreme Commander of the rmed Forces (Lt. Commander Junge). Lt. Com. Junge's verbal reply was as follows:

"The defense of naval bases in France remains the duty of the Army even after a reduction of forces there. It is intended to leave 31 divisions in France during operation "Barbarossa".

In German Naval War Staff 1st Division Ref. 2567/41 Top Secret dated 11.2 dmiral for France was asked what arrangement could be made with Army authorities n France in such a case.

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Page 231.

b). In carrying out operation "Attila" the surprise occupation of Korsika should be considered.

c). For the taking of Malta the employment of the XI Flieger Korps is indispensable.

C-in-C Air Force is to be asked to give an opinion as to whether it is possible to employ the airborne corps against Malta before"Barbarossa" takes place.

age 231

) "BARBAROSSA"

Time for intended negotiations with Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia and umania which should be as late as possible, is to be set by German Supreme ommand of Armed Forces. High Commands are asked to make their respective esires known to the German Supreme Command.

a) Report by Ia concerning an order from Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for instructions for Deception of the Enemy (German Naval War Staff I of 153/41 Top Secret S.O. only).

Aim of the deception is to conceal the preparations for operation "Barbarossa". The important point is that in the first period, i.e., up to about the middle of April the now prevailing uncertainty concerning our intentions should be maintained. Later, the preparations for Barbarossa that can no longer be camouflaged, must then be represented as a deception diversion from the invasion of England. The following directions for this deception are given:

a) <u>for the first period</u>.

To increase the already existing impression of an impending invasion of England. Estimate of new weapons and transportation equipment. Exaggeration of the importance of minor operations and the troops employed therefor. ("Merita" "Sonnenblume" X. Flueger Corps).

age 232.
8.2.41.

<u>Reasons for deployment for "Barbarossa"</u> as exchange measures between West, Homeland, and East.

b) <u>During the second period</u> the deployment for "Barbarossa" is to be made the greatest deception in the history of warfare the purpose of which is to camouflage the last preparations for the invasion of England.

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The Carrying out of this Deception.

Regulating of communications service through Chief of Counter Intelligence ...ead in agreement with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,/Armed Forces ...s Staff/ Department L and the High Commands.

Measures to be taken by the High Commands.

In spite of the farreaching disintegration of the operation "Seelöwe" every-...hing possible should be done to maintain the impression amongst our own troops that the invasion against England is being further prepared.

In order to create further uncertainty about our plans, the Army High Command ...as to prepare the sudden "blocking" of certain territories on the English Channel ...nd in Norway. (Code word for this action: "Albion").

Whether measures having to do with "Barbarossa" e.g., Maximum Capacity ...chedule (Höchstleistungsfahrplanes), cancelling of leaves, etc. can be made to ...oincide with operation "Marita" for purposes of deception is to be investigated ...y Army High Command.

...age 233.
...8.2.41.

12) Report by Ia on intended organization for Operation "Marita".

The following Commands to be established:

a) Admiral Balkan (for the Balkan area to work under Naval WarStaff).
Duties: To safeguard Naval interests in the Balkans, cooperation with other Armed Forces elements (Army group List)
Later on cooperation with the Italian Navy in question of Coastal defense and sea warfare.
Location: At first Bukarest, later Sofia or Athens, to be close to Army Group List.

b) F.O.I.C. Roumania (F.O. of the Naval Mission to Roumania).
(1) Duties: Commanding the entire defense by German and Roumanian units. Under him an Artillery Commander in the Constanza Sector.
(2) Direction of Roumanian Naval warfare.
(3) Liaison with the Head of the German Military Mission in Roumania and the two other Wehrmacht components, to be stationed at Bukarest

c) Naval Liaison Staff, Bulgaria:
Duties: To represent German Naval interests in Bulgaria. To influence measures taken by the Bulgarian Naval Command and Coastal Defense.
To be located at SOFIA.

d) F.O.I.C. Greece.
Duties: To support the army in its actions against Greece in question of enemy naval actions.

...age 248.
...9.2.41.

In regards to the impending operation "Barbarossa" for which all S-boats ...n the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of same can only be considered after con-...lusion of the Barbarossa operations.

Chief of Naval War Staff decided after discussion that on SKL's suggest-...n an evasive reply should be given to the Camp. (Ref. I of 149/41 Top Secret ...O only) (Written in in longhand:) "Since the proposed operation-Barbarossa ...annot yet be determined"

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5). Instructions of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces for operation "Marita".

Construction of bridge across the Danube to begin on 28.2. Invasion of Bulgaria on 2.3.

6). A request of Group North to lay a minefield "Swine" between Shetlands and Bergen approved by Chief of Naval War Staff.

Pages 249/50.

7) Captain Bruening who was sent as a mine adviser for the Roumanian Navy to Bukarest demands for the Roumanian Navy 2000 explosive floats and the necessary personnel for assembling and laying these mines by a destroyer. Furthermore, it is necessary to draft at short notice a suitable and experienced junior officer (Sperr) and mine expert in an advisory capacity. It is desirable for reasons of precautions, to transfer a unit suitable for disposal of Electrical Aircraft Mines in the Danube and Black Sea ports from the sector "S.C. Mine Sweepers Netherlands". There are at present no facilities for sweeping Electrical Aircraft Mines in Roumania.

The shipment of explosive floats is promised together with the necessary personnel and they are both on their way.

The transfer of a mine sweeping unit is refused for the time being and German sweeping apparatus for the Roumanian boats in question is promised. A radio minesweeping apparatus (Stell F R G) is being shipped with the explosive floats.....

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Page 340.

5). To give notice to the OKW Dept L. as to the time required for the intended liaison with the Finnish, Swedish and Roumanian Navies in Operation "Barbarossa".

a) Finland: Time required, 4 weeks for:

aa) Delivery of mines to Finland for intended mining of the Gulf of Finland.
bb) Use of Finnish NAVAL UNITS for joint naval operations in the Northern Baltic, especially in the Gulf of Finland.
cc) Preparation of Finnish Naval bases for acceptance of German naval units (Minelayers, U-boats, and, should occasion arise, S-boats,) for operations on the Finnish area.
dd) Support of German Intelligence Service (B-Dienst) against Russia through the Finnish News Service units as was already the practice up to 1939.

b) Sweden: Time required, 14 days for:

aa) Protection of Swedish territorial waters for carrying on German shipping by the employment of Swedish naval units.
bb) To lay Swedish barrages in Swedish territorial waters, as a continuation of German prohibited areas and as a protection for the sea of Botten (?)

These measures may have to be carried out at a correspondingly later date should negotiations with Sweden start later.

c) Roumania: Time required, 8 days for:

aa) Preparation of Roumanian naval elements and the fitting out of auxiliary mine layers for offensive action in mine warfare.
bb) Increase of general security measures which were possibly limited after the "Marita" operation

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d) In the event that longer periods for the preparations of the Army be necessary and conceded to, great store would be set by the full use being made of the Navy, as the appointed periods are very limited.
(Ref. I op. 154/41 Top Secret S.O. only).....

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Page 354
26.2.41

2) It is the task of German Naval Units in the Balkans to safeguard the Balkan Sector towards the Sea against hostile landing attempts and against the shelling of important coastal installations. Utilization and protection of the shipping routes along the coasts of the Black Sea and the Aegean for our own shipping. The possibility of using the Turkish Straits must be brought about by political means.

3) A later extended task, especially in the Greek Sector, with the aid of Italian naval units, is the conquest of the Aegean Islands, support of the Godecanese, and finally the capture of Crete. The final aim to be envisaged must be the gaining of a jumping off point from which to conduct warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean.

4) For gaining this objective we have at our disposal: German naval units negligible; Roumanian and Bulgarian forces very insignificant; at a later time commitment of Italian forces in the Greek sector can be reckoned with.....

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-33

20 November 1945

I, ESME SHERIFF, P.O., WRNS, 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpts from Document No. C-33.

ESME SHERIFF
P.O., WRNS, 36482

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Exhibit USA 132
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

(PARTIAL)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-35
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

30 January 1941 Page 401(of diary)

7) Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the "BARBAROSSA" case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed Forces.

I) Objectives of war against Britain

a) Main purpose of the navy consists in continued actions against Britain. Possibility of intensifying U-boat war be necessary discontinuance of submarine training in the Baltic and thereby release of part of the training ships for combat duty.

b) Importance of securing of sea lanes on the West Coast of Norway by the temporarily suspended traffic in the Baltic. Since some battle-worthy security forces are not sufficient, additional combat-units from the Western theater of operation are indispensable.

II) Objectives of war against Russia.

Solution of the problem in spite of Russian superiority possibly by the sacrifice of a temporary discontinuance of our sea traffic(ore transports) in the Baltic.

a)Protection of our coast secured by presently existing or about-to-be reorganized coast artillery. Defense against enemy submarine attack by using units of submarines, pursuit ships and mine sweepers.

b)Prevention of escape of enemy combat vessels from the Baltic secured by the defense power of our coastal batteries, by creating new mined waters, with suitable barrage and the existing big air threat.

Additional safety measures:

To get ready loaded minelayers for immediate tactical blockade and the installation of the "SCHLESIEN" and "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN" ships as floating batteries.

Since it is not possible for the Navy to prevent the escape of smaller Russian combat vessels through the WEISSMEER canal, immediate commitment of air force is required to destroy locks of this canal.

c) To declare minesweep waters and to effect blockades to fortify present defensive powers and to discourage operations of Russian waterborn combat units against the Western Baltic at the start of war:

1)Danger zone "OLAND" between MEMEL and south end of "OLAND".

2)Danger zone "BORNHOLM" between KOLBERG-BORNHOLM and BORNHOLMYSTADT.

3)Danger zone at the south outlet of the Sund(renewed and enlarged)

4)Danger zone "GJEDSER ENGE"

5)Danger zone at the Western outlet of the Finnish Bay(offensive blockade)

Demands to the Swedish navy to blockade Swedish waters including the SOUTHKVARKEN-STREET(AALAND SEA)

D

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d) To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:
1) Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combatsvessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.
2) Actions with mines (e.g. with E-boats) against the Baltic strong points, attack of submarines against traffic center points, attack of camouflaged mine-layers from the cliffs. If opportunity arises, premature laying of delayed action mines.
3) To make use of the fighting power of the Finnish fleet is desirable. Important support of German objectives by a surprise laying of a blockade with Finnish ships inside the Gulf of Finland. (If the opportunity arises, material support is required).

e) Protection of the sea lanes in the Ice sea is possible, however, not so the elimination of the Russian main stronghold of POLARNOJE-MURMANSK. Here, a lightning-like attack of the air force is necessary (bombers and air mines)

f) In the Black sea, on account of Russian superiority, limitation to coastal defense and securing the Danube and its estuaries.

For early regulation of the Rumanian and Bulgarian objectives, timely appointment of liaison officers is asked. Besides support by furnishing mines and coastal guns, the transfer of river flotillas from the Netherlands to the lower Danube is intended.

Possibilities of preparing a minelayer for offensive purposes and air mine action are being examined.

g) In case Russia respects Swedish rights in her waters, German sea traffic in Swedish waters under convoy of Swedish war ships is aspired from North Sweden to the KATTEGAT.

h) Even after the elimination of the Russian Baltic Fleet, long lasting effects from the mine war, to be expected of Russia, are to be reckoned with. Since our minesweeper units are not at disposal, it is attempted to use also Finnish and Swedish combat vessels and to commit captured Russian booty ships, if the opportunity arises, with a Russian crew. The head of the naval war staff agrees with these proposals. They are submitted to the Armed Forces High Command per naval war staff I op 94/41. Top Military Secret, matter for Chief.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-35.

13 Nov. 1945.

I, Ernst M. Cohn, PFC. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-35.

Ernst M. Cohn
Pfc. 33925738.

C35

Exhibit USA. 138
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-39
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Military Secret

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L(I op)

Fuehrer's Headquarters
(no date)

Top Secret (Chef Sache) 21 copies
Only through officer

3rd copy Ob. d. M.
I op.00845/41
Received 6 June
Enclosures: --

The Fuhrer has authorized the appended time table as a foundation for further preparations for "Barbarossa". If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.

Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed: Keitel

DISTRIBUTION:

C-i-C of Army (Gen. Staff of Army)	1st and 2nd copy
C-i-C of Navy (Command of Ocean Navy)	3rd and 4th copy
C-i-C of Air (Air Leader Staff)	5th and 6th copy
Defense Office Norway	7th copy

OKW

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab	8th copy
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WNV	16th copy
WPr	17th copy
Wohrm.Trsp.Chef	18th copy
Amt Ausl./Abw	19th copy
Abt. Ausl.	20th copy
Wi Rue Amt	21th copy

Pencil note:

Correct I op 00910/41
(old Pages 6 and 10 destroyed and replaced by new ones.)
F.M. 11 June 41

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H1124 - 0011

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-39
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Enclosure with OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I op)
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret

TIME TABLE BARBAROSSA

State of preparations on 1 June 41

1.) General

The time table for the maximum massing of troops in the East was put into operation on the 22 May.

2.) Negotiations with Friendly States

a) Bulgaria is requested not to weaken materially her units which are protecting her Turkish frontier.

b) According to the demand of the Supreme Commander of the German troops in Rumania the Rumanians have started a camouflaged part mobilization to defend their frontier against possible Russian attack.

c) Utilization of Hungarian territoryfor concentrating parts of Army Group South is only considered if it is necessary to push a German unit between Hungarian and Rumanian troops. This question will not be put to the Hungarian authorities till the middle of June.

d) Two German divisions are drawn up in the Eastern part of Slovakia. Reinforcements will be unloaded in the area around Prosov.

e) Negotiations for preparations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25 May.

f) Sweden has not been consulted. Negotiations will be started after commencement of operations.

3.) Army:

(a) West:

Total strength (after departure of 6 Infantry Divisions and introduction of 5 formations of the fifteenth wave from the Reich during the period 22 May - 1 June:

40 Infantry Divisions, 1 Infantry Division (motorized), 1 Police Division, 1 Armoured Brigade.

Attila or (underlining in pencil) Isabella can be executed at ten days' warning (this holds good also for the Air Force)

(b) North:

Total strength 6 Infantry Divisions, 2 Mountain Divisions, 1 Lines of Communication Division, SS - Battle Group North and 140 GHQ Batteries (Heeresbatterien) for coastal defense.

In addition 1 Lines of Communication Division and 18 GHQ Batteries are scheduled for transport fromthe home area to Norway.

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(continuation of C-39)

1 reinforced Infantry Division with Corps troops is scheduled for transport from the home area to Finland. Of these forces 1 Infantry Division, 2 Mountain Divisions and SS - Battle Group North are to be committed for Silver Fox.

It is planned after the beginning of the operations to bring up a further Infantry Division by rail across Sweden for the attack on Hangö.

(c) Balkans:

In the Balkans are stationed, in addition to the formations scheduled for the final occupation, 8 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured Division which will be transported in part into the Concentration Area East as OKH Reserve but not before B-Day.

(d) East:

Total strength is raised to 76 Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, 3 Armoured Divisions.

The Army Groups and Armies have taken over command in their sectors, partly by means of camouflaged battle Headquarters (Arbeitsstabe).

4.) Navy:

Command of the Baltic has been established, for the present in Kiel, later in Swinemunde. Group North have been supplied with additional protective forces from the West.

5.) Air Force:

Air Fleet 3 has taken over sole command in the conduct of air warfare against Britain.

Air Fleet 2 has been withdrawn from action and transferred to the East.

VIII Air Corps which has been earmarked for Barbarossa will be transferred as soon as possible to the East. Several anti-aircraft Battalions which were given up by Twelvth Army to Air Fleet 4 are still tied down operationally in the South East.

6.) Camouflage:

Second phase of deception of the enemy (Codenames: Haifisch and Harpune) in operation with the aimof giving the impression that landings are being prepared from Norway, the Channel Coast and Brittany. Troop Concentration East (Aufmarsch Ost) will be represented as a deception exercise for the landing in England.

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H1124 - 0013

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
from 1 June	1	Move up of Echelon, to last till 22 June				Main effort in first part by 4b-Echelon (Air Force Components) in second part (from about 10 June) mobile formations of the Army.
		Additional Transfers to the East 4 Corps Staffs 14 Armoured Divisions 12 Infantry Divisions (Motorized)				Offensive Activity of the Airforce With the transfer of flying formations to the East slackening off of offensive activity against Britain and in the Atlantic. With the transport away of anti-aircraft units the anti-aircraft protection of Air Defense Area Centre will be diminished.
	2		"Schlesien" and "Schleswig-Holstein" are ready for action, scheduled as floating batteries.	Armed Forces Area Norway current till 22 June Transport of the last 18 Army Coast Defense-Batteries.		
	3		U-Boat School, "Tirpitz" and School Squadron transferred to Drontheim.			Transfer of the Navy Units camouflaged as concentration for "Harpoon".

C39

H1124-0014

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	-2- Navy	OKW	Remarks
	4			Minelayers from Area West assigned to Group North, Minelayes of Group North change their bases. Strong concentration of mine-carrying craft in the Baltic.		Camouflage; exercises during the summer months which are unsuitable for mine-laying.
	5			Task Force (German help with construction Cruiser "L") will be recalled from Russia in groups by stages (exclamation mark & line in red pencil at left side)		
5 June	6	See OKW		See OKW	Armed Forces Commander Norway: Transports Stettin-Bottenhaefen: 5 - 14 June reinforced 169th Infantry Division in 7 Echelons. 8 June. First landing in Finland. Transports Oslo-Bottenhaefen: 5 - 12 June XXXVI Corps with Corps troops in 4 Echelons. 9 June. First landing in Finland	

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H1124-0015

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Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
7 June	7	Intended start of transporting VIIIth Air Corps and Anti-Aircraft Artillery				Adherance to deadline not yet ascertained with certainty (struck though in pencil)
	8				Armed Forces Commander Norway: Start of movement by road of SS Battle Group North from Kirkenes Southward	
8 June	9				Start of laying of the prepaed harbour protective barrages of the East and Middle Baltic and of the Gjedser Submarine net obstruction.	
	10				Armed Forces Commander Norway: First landing in Finland of the transports from Germany. First landing in Finland of the transports from Norway.	)Warning for)Russia. The)occupation)of the)Petsamo area)must be given)up immediat-)ely in the)event of)Russian)offensive)action)against)Finland

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H1124-0016

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
from 10 June	12				Battle HQs for 4 Armed Forces Commanders Staffs at action stations.	Scheduled for political administrative areas East.
10 June	13				Armed Forces Commander Norway: Start of movement by road and rail from the Bottenhafen northwards	
12 June	14			The scheduled minelayers and E-Boat flottillas (S-Flottillen) transferred to Finland		Camouflage as express transports for North Norway via Finland
about 12 June	15				Decision on Barbarossa Conference with the Rumanians	
14 June	16		(original p. 6 marked "new" in pencil)		Hungary: Hint to Hungarian Armed Forces to reinforce their safeguards on the border against Soviet Russia	
	17			Russian ships kept by disguised measures from entering the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Canal and (from 17 June) Gotenhafen. (two strokes in blue pencil at the side)		

H1124-0017

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
15 June	18				Warning order on adherence to arrange B-Day	
from 17 June	19		Closing of schools in the Eastern area	Inconspicuous withdrawal of German Merchant shipping from Soviet Russian ports		
	20			Suspension of further outward sailings to Soviet Russian ports. Similar measures to be suggested to the Finns through Attache'.		
	21			U-Boats of Group North to take up positions in the Baltic unobserved		
	22		Start of planned aerial reconnaissance of the Baltic		Decision on this point	Depending on General Situation
till 18 June	23				Still possible to continue forming the point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) of the Army without discarding camouflage	
18 June	24		Concentration of Air Force to be concluded (less VIII Air Corps)		Armed Forces Commander Norway	Intention to attack need no longer be camouflaged (Underlined and marked in red pencil

1st enclosure to OKM I op 00910/41 pr

Switch of XXXVI Corps Groups from the Artic route to the East

H1124 - 0018

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
	25		Order for protection of Fuehrer Headquarters			
19 June	26			Scheduled return into home ports of the shipping space earmarked for transports to Finland		Shortly before start of operations Army: To cary out the closure of traffic of waterways which cross the frontier. Air Force Decree prohibiting take off of civilian air traffic. Navy: Decree prohibiting merchant shipping from putting to sea from Baltic ports. OKW: Order for a general clamp down on foreign intelligence (Military Intelligence (Foreign Branch (Security)).
20 June	27		Conclusion planned of Concentration of VIII Air Corps.			
21 June	28			Minelayers and Mine-carrying Craft (E-Boats) make ready for sea and put out at staggered times for their operational harbours.		
21 June	29	Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (spaetester Anhaltetermin)			Cancelled by Codeword: "Altona" or further confirmation of start of attack by codeword: "Dortmund".	Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort (Schwerpunkt)(concentration of armour & artillery) must be reckoned with

C-39

H1124-0019

Date	Serial No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
21/22 June	30			Execution of the measures laid down for blocking the Gulfs of Finland and Riga.		In the event of an encounter with enemy forces the use of arms is authorized (underlined in red pencil)
22 June	31	Invasion Day H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Force. 0330 hours.				Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force
	32	Execution of closure of the frontiers of the German Reich which are bounded by the Barbarossa area		Seizure of ships in German, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch & Belgium ports which originate from the Barbarossa area.	Frontiers of the Reich area and of the occupied areas to be closed to all nationals of the Barbarossa area. (Military Intelligence/Foreign Branch (Security))	
	33				Mountain Corps occupies Petsamo area	Artic, East Baltic and Black Seas declared operational zones by wireless etc. Extension of danger zones for mines announced. (dates received by Foreign Office)

H1124-0020

Date.	Serial No.	Army.	Air Force.	Navy.	OKW.	Remarks.
	34.				Report to the Supreme Reich Authorities & Party Offices on the successful closing of the German Reich frontier bordering on the Barbarossa area or the rear boundary of the operational zone (WFSt/Liv)	-11-
	35.	Distribution of Forces for Barbarossa on Invasion Day. Total Strength (less the formations under command of Military Commander Norway): 80 Infantry Divisions; 1 Cavalry Division; 17 Armoured Divisions; 12 Infantry Divisions (Motorised); 9 Lines of Communications Divisions; 2 Formations of the Fifteenth Wave & 2 Infantry Divisions as Army Reserves (Already arrival with 4b Echelon)	Air-Fleet 4 with: 3 Reconnaissance Squadrons; 12 Twin-Engined Bomber Wings (Kampfgruppen) (1 temporarily); 6 Pursuit Wings. Air-Fleet 2. with: 3 Reconnaissance Squadrons; 10 Twin-Engined Bomber Wings; 8 Dive Bomber Wings; 2 ME 110 Wings (Zerstoerergruppen); 1 & Army Cooperation Wings (Schlachtgruppen); 9 Pursuit Wings (2 temporarily). Air-Fleet 1. with: 2 Reconnaissance Squadrons; 9 Twin-Engined Bomber Wings; 3 2/3 Pursuit Wings (2/3 temporarily)			

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Date.	Serial No.	Army.	Air Force.	Navy	OKW.	Remarks.
approx. from 25.June	36.	Start of transport forward of 5th Echelon (OKH Reserves) Duration till about 20.July Total available: 22 Infantry Divisions 2 Armoured Divisions 1 Infantry Division (Motorised) 1 Police Division (including 9 Infantry Divisions, 1 Police Division from the West, to which it is planned to bring up 2 formations of the Fifteenth wave.)			Sweden: Negotiations for the use of swedish railways for (a) Bringing up of 163 Infantry Division from South Norway to Rovanieni (b) Supply transports. Employment of a German transport organization and a Signals Liaison Officer.	
	37.				Japan, Manchukuo, Turkey Iran and Afghanistan to be prevailed upon to cut off the sending of any supplies to Russia, by diplomacy	
	38.				Armed Forces Commander Norway: 23.-27.(or 28.)June, State of readiness for attack on Murmansk. 23.30.June.State of readiness for attack on Kandalakscha.	
at carliest 28.June	39.				Finland: Attacking Grp "Ladoga" ready to attack.	Decision necessary five days before start of attack whether point of main effort is to be west or east of Lake Ladoga

H1124-0022
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Date.	Serial No.	Army	Air Force.	Navy.	OKW.	Remarks
28.June 40. or 29.June					Armed Forces Commander Norway:	
					Attack on Murmansk.	
1.July 41.					Armed Forces Commander Noeway:	
					Attack on Kandalakscha.	
2.July 42.					4 Armed Forces Commanders Staffs ready on call.	

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H1124-0023

H1124 - 0024

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-39

19 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-39.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc., 33925738

Exhibit USA 139
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

H1124 - 0025

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-78
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-G/C-78

Translation

Office of Wehrmacht adjutant to the Fuehrer
Br.B.No.7 Top Secret

TOP SECRET
Only by Officer

at Berchtesgaden
9th June 1941

Top Secret

Re: Conference "Barbarossa"

1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on "Barbarossa" by the Commanders of Army Groups, Armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.

2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.

3. Time Table

a) 11.00 hrs ..... "Silver Fox"

b) 12.00 hrs - 14.00 hrs..... Army Group South

c) 14.00 hrs - 15.30 hrs..... Lunch party for all participants in conference

d) From 15.30 hrs..... Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group "Center" in this order.

Participants see enclosed list of participants.
(List of names, etc. follows)

(signed) Schmundt

Colonel of the general staff and Chief Wehrmacht adjutant to the Fuehrer

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

I.) Morning and afternoon:

1.) Army: General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch
General Halder
Maj.General Paulus
Colonel Heusinger
Lt. Colonel von Gyldenfeldt

2.) Navy: Captain Wagner

3.) Air Force: Reich Marshal Goering
General Field Marshal Milch
Lt. General Jeschonnek
Maj. General Bodenschatz
Brig.General von Waldau

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4.) High Command of the Armed Forces:
General Field Marshal Keitel
Lt.General of the Artillery Jodl
Brig.General Warlimont
Major Christian of the General Staff

5.) Office of adjutant of the Armed Forces:
Colonel Schmundt of the General Staff
Captain von Puttkamer (Navy)
Major Engel
Major von Below

II.) Morning:

1.) "Silver Fox":
Army: General v.Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway
Air Force: General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5

2.) Group "South"
Army: General Field Marshal v. Rundstedt Army Group South
General Field Marshal v. Reichenau, High Command 6th Army
Infantry Lt.General v. Stuelpnagel, High Command 17th Army
General v. Schobert, High Command 11th Army
General v. Kleist, Armored Group 1

Air Force:
General Loehr, Air Fleet 4.

III.) Joint dinner of all participants
In addition: General Fromm, General Udet
(arrival: 13.40 o'clock, 78 Wilhelmstrasse)

IV.) Afternoon:

1.) High Command of the Navy:
Grand Admiral Raeder
Vice Admiral Fricke
Captain Schulte-Moenting

2.) Baltic:
General Admiral Carls, Navy Group North
Vice Admiral Schmundt, Commander Baltic

3.) Group"North"
Army: General Field Marshal Ritter v. Leeb, Army Group North
General Busch, High Command 16th Army
General v. Kuechler, High Command 18th Army
General Hoopner, Armored Group 4

Air Force: Col. General Keller, Air Fleet 1

4.) Group "Center":
Army: General Field Marshal v. Bock, Army Group "Center"
General Field Marshal v. Kluge, High Command 4th Army
General Strauss, High Command 9th Army
General Guderian, Armored Group 2
General Hoth, Armored Group 3

Air Force: General Field Marshal Kesselring, Air Fleet 2

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H1124 - 0027

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-78

November 15, 1945

I VIRGINIA VON SCHON, 046318 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-78.

VIRGINIA VON SCHON
046318.

C-78

H1124-0028

Exhibit USA 136
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-170
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1) A 1,13 25 Aug

The already started "Incident Weiss will be stopped at 2030 hours because of changed political conditions". (Close Friendship Pact England/Poland of 25 Aug noon, and information from Duce, that he would be true to his word, however, having to ask necessarily for large supply of raw materials.)

2) 31 Aug

Decision for opening hostilities against Poland.
Falls at 1240 hours.

3) A 1,95 17 Sept

Russian entry into Poland is valued by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) as an event of the most far-reaching importance, the resulting possible effect for Germany of this must be estimated as being especially favorable.

4) C VII/39,9 23 Sep

Navy Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme Commander for the first time studies the question of Russia's participation in a) the cession of submarines, b) the outfitting of auxiliary cruisers (MURMANSK), c) the calling at Russian ports - Fuehrer will commission the foreign office with clarification of the questions.

5) A 1,163 25 Sep

There is no doubt about Russia's honest attitude. Russian government is convinced of the necessity of cooperation with Germany (Naval Attache Moscow, BL.186, 27 Sep)

6) C VIII/39,86 28 Sep

Conclusion of German-Russian border and friendship pact (compare introduction)

7) A 2,28 3 Oct

Naval Supreme Commander orders examination of the possibilities of support by Russia for German naval warfare, to be forwarded to the foreign office. Foreign minister believes, that far-reaching support may be expected - Bases (STUTZPUNKTE) in Norway with Russian help.

8) A 2,50 5 Oct

Threatening situation of German (Auslandsdeutsche) living in Estonia and Latvia, because of Russian demands - "The increase of Russian influence in the Baltic States is happening with the full accord of German political policy." The evacuation of Germans (Auslandsdeutsche), planned by the foreign office, with steamers and men-o'-war was not approved by the Fuehrer in agreement with the naval supreme command, since the situation is not as yet clear, and since the impression of misunderstandings between Russia and Germany must be avoided under all circumstances. On 6 Oct, calmer appraisal of the situation. Naval Supreme Commander orders on 9 Oct lifting of the alert for the planned actions.

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9) C VII/39,11 10 Oct

Navy Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Russia has offered a well situated base (Stützpunkt) near Murmansk (Compare BL.23). One auxiliary cruiser in Murmansk for outfitting. Naval Supreme Commander points out value of the winning of Norwegian bases (Drontheim) with the aid of Russian pressure. Fuehrer promises examination; refuses request to build or buy submarines in Russia for political reasons.

10) A 2,93 11 Oct

English-Russian trade agreement (lumber for rubber and zinc). Rubber and zinc via Russia just as important for Germany as lumber for England. Export of Russian lumber will take place on English or neutral ships from Murmansk, so that German interference remains possible. No damage intended at all by Russia against German economic warfare. (BL 170, 21 Oct)

11) A 2,95 17 Oct

Conference of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) with Naval Attaché Moscow, discloses that far-reaching Russian support, as expected by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL). Repair of warships, outfitting of auxiliary cruisers at Russian yards - is not possible because of political and technical reasons. Preparations for "Base North /Basis Nord/" are in progress. Attaché requests the immediate stoppage of espionage (Nachrichtenbeschaffung) against Russia through neutral states, to prevent Russian distrust.

12) A 2,193 24 Oct

Russia will fulfill in full accord with Germany's policy all treaty obligations; she will not permit active hostile position of Turkey against us or passage of English and French warships through the Dardanelles (Report Ambassador Ritter).

13) A 2,203 25 Oct

Departure of German vessels from Murmansk; English and other ships are kept back by the Russians, until the German ships are safe.

14) A 2,205 20 Oct

Sharp Russian note against English blockade warfare.

15) C VIII 39,162 26 Oct

Opinion of the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) of the Russian wishes for the delivery of war material. Russian economic help is of decisive importance for us. Offer was made in such a generous form, that success of the English economic blockade appears impossible. Accordingly, generous reciprocation required from the German side as well.

16) C VIII/39,164,173 26 Oct

At the suggestion of Molotov, who has mentioned political apprehension concerning the appearance of German warships in the Finnish Gulf, German economic warfare is restricted in the Baltic to West of 20° East; Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) does not consider himself bound to this for the entire future (also, A 2,217).

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17) A 2,249 31 Oct

Foreign Political speech by Molotov; permanent friendship between Russia and Germany; sharp attacks against English blockade "in violation of International law".

18) C VIII/39,175 FF 2 Nov

The behaviour of the Russian Naval Command is generally cordial and cooperative. ("Base North /Basis Nord/", provisioning of merchantmen in Murmansk, aid in the return "Bremen"). Naval Supreme Commander finds himself repeatedly in a position to express his appreciation for that to the Russian Navy. Statement of the Russian naval commissar on occasion of the presentation of the communication from Naval Supreme Commander: "His answer would not consist of empty words, but actions, and only after their execution would he forward a reply to the supreme commander." (Compare C VIII/39 BL 177, 200,203).

19) A 3,5 4 Nov

Demand of Russian economic delegation of delivery of ship hulls "Seyolitz", "Lützow", continued construction with German help. Naval Supreme Commander basically desires greatest cooperation, however, rejects delivery of Seyolitz and decrease of our own building program in favor of assistance to Russia. Ship hull "Lützow" will be made available. (C VII/39,26).

20) C VII 39,34 10 Nov.

Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer rejects purchase of Russian submarines again, since he is convinced, that the Russian ships are in bad condition, and that the Russians "should not see any weakness with us".

22) C VII/39,43 25 Nov

Situation conference of the Naval Supreme Commander in a session of department heads (Amtschefsitzung): Russia not able to act at the present time; as long as Stalin in the government, a positive attitude certain. Changes are possible after years of inner strengthening, especially in the event of the overthrow or death of Stalin. The expansion of Russian interests in the direction of the Gulf of Persia is supported by Germany. Northern states under the pressure Germany/Russia neutral. - Southeastern states under the pressure Russia neutral. - Germany in the East has no military ties. "For the first time in 50 years a one-front war is possible."

23) A 5,265 30 Nov

Begin of hostilities between Russia and Finland.

24) A 4,13 3 Dec

Declaration by Molotov that the primary goals of Russia lie in South-Eastern Europe and on the Black Sea. Rapid solution of the Finnish problem is to be attempted to free Russian forces for other missions.

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25) A 4,45 7 Dec

High Russian armament demands in return for economic aid, from the Navy among others "Lützow", "Seyolitz", "Prince Eugen". According to the Fuehrer's decision, own armament may not be retarded under any circumstance. Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) considers besides "Lützow" the delivery of plans for new construction and sample pieces.

26) C VII/39,49,56 8 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Further sales of ships to Russia: Fuehrer rejects sale of "Seyolitz" and "Prinz Eugen" and towers of "H" and "J". Naval Supreme Commander recommends delivery of "Bismarck" plans. Fuehrer reserves decision for himself. (Compare also A 4,60). - - Moral burden for Germany as a result of Russian-Finnish conflict.

27) C VII/39,58 12 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander desires a correct stand-in the Russian-Finnish conflict; no support for Finland (by way of unreliable burden); advocates favoring Russia; points out the advantages offered by Russia. Increase of anti-German, pro-English feeling in Norway because of Russian-Finnish conflict. In several circles, the opinion exists that the partition of Norway between Russia and Germany has already been agreed upon (BL 68)

28) A 4,85 12 Dec

Return "Bremen" from Murmansk - Valuable Russian assistance.

29) C VIII/39, 248 FF 14 Dec

Incident between Russian naval units and German steamers. (Details and settlement see A 4, BL.86,87,129).

30) A 4,199 17 Dec

Chief, Naval Operations concludes from the weakness of Russian fighting power, as revealed in Finland, for our own attitude against Russia. . . . . "not to over estimate in German actions and decisions the still noticeable impact of the colossus Soviet Russia - an impact that is noticeable despite the existence of the pact of friendship; but on the contrary to throw into the scale in all negotiations, the military and political strength of Germany - perhaps even more so than has been done in the past."

31) C VII 39,68 30 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander reports: Settlement of incidents during Russian Naval warfare against Finland (compare C VIII/39,248 FF) - Negotiation with Russia for the use of the Siberian sealanes by German warships; no difficulties anticipated. (BL.85)

32) A 4,225 31 Dec

Evaluation of the Red Army by the German General Staff: In quantity a gigantic military instrument. - Commitment of the "mass". - Organization, equipment and means of leadership unsatisfactory - principles of leadership good; leadership itself, however, too young and inexperienced. - Communication

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system bad, transportation bad; - troops not very uniform; no personalities - simple soldier good natured, quite satisfied with very little. Fighting qualities of the troops in a heavy fight, dubious. The Russian "mass" is no match for an army, with modern equipment and superior leadership.

33) A 5,62 10 Jan

German-Russian economic negotiations continue satisfactorily. Strong Russian interest in Naval deliveries. -- "Lützow", heavy turrets, "Tirpitz" plans, naval instruments. - Naval Supreme Commander decides that compliance must depend basically upon the extent of our being dependent upon Russian shipments.

34) A 5,82 12 Jan

Chief Naval Operations (SKL) attaches importance to the utilization of the Siberian sealanes which also serve Russian economic interests: (Compare BL.153, 19 Jan)

35) A 5,205 25 Jan

Dirficulties in German-Russian trade negotiations, because Russian government demands "reciprocal assistance" - that is to say: no performance without contemporaneous corresponding German performance.

36) C VII/40,91 26 Jan

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer desires delay of delivery of ship hull "Lützow" and construction plans "Bismarck" as long as possible; hopes with favorable course of war, "to get out of it all together."

37) A 6,49 6 Feb

Favorable report of Naval Attaché Moscow on Siberian sealane; utilization by auxiliary cruiser also considered "Ship 45")

38) A 6,89 11 Feb

Conclusion of German-Russian trade agreement.

39) C VII/40,93 23 Feb

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander proposes - now that the Russian trade agreement has been concluded - change of the 20° East limitation for German naval warfare in the Baltic (compare No. 16 above), (also look further under No. 43).

40) C VII/40,103 9 Mar

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander suggests to inform the Russians during the occupation of Norway that Tromsö is not occupied by the Germans which will be considered by the Russians as recognition for their interests. "Better, the Russians sit in 'Tromsö' than the English". Fuehrer prefers to have the Russians "not to sit so close", believes that Tromsö also should be occupied by us.

41) A 7,97 13 Mar

On 12 Feb - Peace Russia - Finland.

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42) A 7,218 29 Mar

Speech by Molotov, contains sharp criticism of Anglo-French war policy and affirmation of the friendly relations Russia/ Germany.

43) C VIII/40,159 1 Apr

Fuehrer orders that wishes of the Chief Naval Operations (SKL) for lifting of the 20° East border for warfare in the Baltic will no longer be pressed for political reasons.

44) C VIII/40,169 5 Apr

/According to an attaché report/ the temporary limitations in the use of "Base North /Basis Nord/" - tanker "Jan Wellem" and Molotov's attitude of refusal in the question of the use of a far-eastern base /Stützpunkt/ are to be traced back to the present Russian nervousness because of the future position of England and France toward Russia. (Compare A 8,38).

45) C VIII/40,180 10 Apr

Russia declares herself disinterested in the Norway action; shows understanding for German measures.

46) A 8,154 16 Apr

Tension and border incidents between Roumania and Russia.

47) A 8,231 22 Apr

Russian intentions for the incorporation of the border states becomes recognizable.

48) A 9,2 1 May

English efforts for a trade agreement with Russia. Russian government unfavorable; she cannot discuss in any way limitations of its exports to other countries (compare also BL. I98 20 May).

49) C VIII/40,256 18 May

Auxiliary cruiser warfare in the Black Sea: Desires of the Chief, Naval Operations postponed because of unfavorable attitude of foreign office - deference to Russia, Balkan States, Turkey. (Compare also BL.281)

50) A 9,210 21 May

According to report of Ambassador in Moscow, very positive position of the Russian press to the German successes of war (compare BL.21,270: Uneasiness because of German victory cannot be found).

51) A 9,242 24 May

Tension Russia/Roumania: Uneasiness with regard to Russian entry into Bessarabia.

52) A 9,285 28 May

Bessarabian question: In the opinion of the foreign office, Russia is prepared for taking a hand in the Balkans, but for the time being no action is to be expected (Compare A 10,103).

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53) A 9,295 29 May

Russia refuses to receive the English special plenipotentiary for trade negotiations, Sir Stafford Cripps. (CR becomes later British Ambassador in Moscow - A 10,53).

54) C VII/40,221 4 June

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer describes as his further goal: after the defeat of France, reduction of the army, discharge of the older age classes especially skilled workers. Emphasis on air corps and navy. No talk about Russia as yet.

55) A 10,43 5 June (Remark of B.)

Estimate of situation by Chief, Naval Operations: Russia keenly appreciates German military successes, however, she fears after decisive victory by Germany, German attack against Russia. But allied victory is not desired either. Active participation of Russia in the war is entirely out of the question because of military weakness and inner-political unstability. Stalin definitely determined not to sacrifice himself for the allies. Official policy of Russia toward Germany still absolutely correct. However, possibility of an attempt, to sabotage slowly the economic cooperation is not out of the question. Because of apprehensiveness of further development of the relationships to Germany, Russia considers further expansion of bases in the Baltic indicated; pressure on Lithuania, Estonia points to the attempted full domination of this area.

56) A 10,106 10 May

Naval Attaché, Moscow reports noticeable cooling off and technical difficulties on the part of the Russians; sees for that in apprehensiveness over English attitude in case of too strong leanings toward Germany and over German attack after victory over the western powers.

57) A 10,125 12 June

Russian demands on Lithuania; situation critical

58) A 10.157 15 June

Russian ultimatum, followed by entry into Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia - This development in the opinion of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) was to be expected for some time.

59) A 10,197 19 June

Official notification about operations in the Baltic by Molotov was to "end all intrigues, by which the western powers had attempted in the Baltic states, to sow distrust between Russia and Germany."

60) A 10,270 20 June FF

Russian entry into Bessarabia imminent. By intervention of German Government and German pressure on Roumania, peaceful settlement was reached by cession of Bessarabia and North Boucovenia. (29 June).

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C VIII/40,359 28 June

Chief, Naval Operations describes Russian action as "expected for some time". - In one German note to Russia on 22 June 41, it is said: "The German Ambassador in Moscow declares to the Soviet government that the decision comes to the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) 'entirely unexpectedly'".

61) A 11,50 5 July

In the Balkans <u>further Russian advances</u> with the goal of turning the land to Bolshevism feared.

62) A 11,62 6 July

Penetration of the Baltic by Bolshevism.

63) A 11,81 8 July

Contrary to contradictory foreign reports the foreign office emphasizes <u>correct behaviour of Russian government</u> toward Germany.

64) A 11,108 10 July

Russia desires closer relationships with Bulgaria and further advances in the Balkans with Bulgarian help. Bulgaria remaining reserved as well as Roumania looking to Germany for support. Increasing Russian influence in Yugoslavia - Russian advances against Iran.

64a) C VII/40,226 11 July

<u>Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer</u>: Naval Supreme Commander requests timely notification in case of complications in the East to be able to protect the undefended Baltic coast against surprise actions.

65) A 11,153 14 July

Quietening in the Balkans after conclusion of the Munich negotiations between Germany/Italy/Hungary.

66) A 11,153 14 July

In cooperation with Russia preparations for the <u>departure of "Ship 45" by the Siberian Sealane</u>: (Compare BL.117)

67) A 11,235 21 July

Baltic States declare merger (Anschluss) with Russia.

68) C VII 40,251 21 July

<u>Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer</u>: <u>Fuehrer</u> lectures:

a) on America
b) on Russia, whose entry into the war, especially because of the aerial threat to Germany, could be very pleasant. Even though Russia views Germany's great successes with tears in her eyes, she herself has no intention to enter the war against Germany. It is naturally a duty to weigh the American and Russian question seriously. Rapid waging of war is in the German interest; but there is no urgent

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need for it. Material is plentiful, food supply is secure. The fuel situation is the most difficult, but as long as Roumania and Russia deliver, and hydro-electric works can be safeguarded against air attacks, it is not critical.

69) A 11,249 22 July

New demands by Russia on Finland.

70) A 11,261 23 July

Conference Stalin-Cripps: English attempt to split Russia away from Germany failed completely. According to Stalin's opinion, German successes do not threaten Russia. Relationships between Germany and Russia rest on fundamentals of national interests of both countries. Russia objects to England's intervention in her foreign trade. No power can claim exclusive leadership in the Balkan States; Russia also does not claim that. Russia objects to exclusive role of Turkey in the Black Sea and the Straits (compare political overall picture 170/40).

71) A 11,330 28 July

Rumor about Russian ultimatum to Finland untrue according to foreign office. However, Molotov has complained about the anti-Russian attitude in Finland. Undoubtedly tried to influence the Finnish government to facilitate a later coordination (Gleichschaltung).

72) A 12,1 1 Aug

Speech by Molotov. Corresponds to speech referred to in No. 70: "Removed for Germany friction points in the East, and created assumed certainty in the East" - but according to C VIII/40,407 threats against Finland.

73) A 12,41 4 Aug

According to Naval Attaché in Helsinki - depressed mood in Finland; hope that one day Germany would bring help to Finland after all.

74) A 12,143 12 Aug

Departure "Ship 45" Via Siberian sealane with Russian assistance.

75) A 12,149 13 Aug

Turkish anxiety because of Russian advances against Dardanelles and Roumania.

76) C VII/40,270 13 Aug

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer desires stronger fortification of the North Norwegian Fjords, so that attacks by the Russians (!) these according to A 12, 150 in case of a new conflict Russia - Finland - would be hopeless.

77) A 12,301 20 Aug

Evaluation of Russian long distance aims by Chief Naval Operations (SKL): Ice, free North-Atlantic port. Advance

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through the Balkans for the annexation of the Dardanelles and the domination of the Black Sea. Advance through Iran to the Persian Gulf. Strong pressure on Finnish internal policies. Subversive creation of disturbances. In Rumania, especially in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, panslavic-communist propaganda - partially successful. Strong activities by agents in Greece. Demands on Turkey unknown. Force of arms not expected at present. Russian behavior strongly dependent on further development of war. The political weight of the Axis should keep the peace of the Balkans. Economic deliveries by Russia are good beyond expectations. (Compare C VIII/40,461).

78) A 12,372 31 Aug

Russia reinforces troops on the Finnish border because of tense situation.

79) T.P.

In August 1940, begin of transfer of German troops to the Eastern border (according to proclamation of the Fuehrer of 22 June 1941 - T.P. of 23 June 1941).

To No. 79 compare directive of Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) of 27 Aug 40 in documents "See Lowe", directives of OKW I, 1 Volume, 1 Leaf 26: Transfer of 10 Divisions and 2 Armored Divisions to the Government General for the possibility of a necessary rapid action in the interest of a protection of the Rumanian oil fields.

80) A 13,102 8 Sept

Russian annoyance and supposed deterioration of the relationship with Germany as a result of the Vienna arbitration (Wiener Schiedsspruch) (30 Aug) with the border guarantee of Rumania directed mainly against Russia, and as a result of the uncertainty of German Eastern policy. Both is considered as merely temporary by the Germans. (Compare also A 12,352 and C VIII/40,488) F.

81) A 13,119 10 Sept

Since "Base North /Basis Nord/" is no longer needed after the occupation of Norway, appreciation by the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) and note of appreciation by Naval Supreme Commander for valuable Russian assistance, Russian government declares that they are satisfied that they could be of use to us. (Compare C VIII/40 BL 464/501).

82) A 13,155 12 Sept

Lecture by Naval Attaché in Moscow: Russian attitude, which was very reserved at the beginning, is now markedly friendly; reason for change not clearly understandable. Attaché emphasizes the obliging assistance at the departure "Ship 45" by the Siberian sealane - see also BL. 159,237 - relates valuable observations on the good progress of the Russian Naval rearmament: numerous destroyers, submarines 2000 tons, three battle ships under construction in Leningrad; thus obvious connection to Russian demands for 2 sets of 38 cm double turrets.

83) A 13,196 14 Sept

Conference Naval Attaché in Tokyo with former Japanese Ambassador in Rome (Shiratori). Ambassador: Ambassador does not

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believe in a long duration of the German-Russian understanding, hopes for the joining of Germany with Japan for the destruction of Russia.

84) C VIII/40,516 18 Sept

Anti-German propaganda in the Red Army. Assumption of German intentions to attack and thesis of the inevitable German-Russian conflict. (Compare A 13,221: Distrust in the Supreme Soviets; Molotov expresses calming reassurances: "everything has been done for the security of the Russian western border")

85) A 13,349 26 Sept

Official Russian newspaper article emphasizes that Russia stands outside the present light for the Balkan peninsula "true to its peace and neutrality policy". Contrary to that, according to reports of the German Ambassador in Moscow, there is no doubt about the very strong Russian interest in the Balkans, where "nothing can be decided without Russia".

86) C VII/40,285 26 Sept

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the North will then be still necessary. (Thus such an action must have been considered in the meantime: Remark of B.)

Fuehrer agrees to these decisions. Russia will be induced to advance in the direction of Persia, India in order to find there an outlet to the ocean; that could be more important for Russia than the position in the Baltic. They too were of the opinion that Russia was seriously afraid of Germany's strength, he considers Russian-Finnish entanglements this year improbable.

87) 27 Sept

Conclusion of the Three Power Pact.

88) C VIII/40,549 29 Sept

Three Power Pact: Russian government sees in the treaty a recognition of Russian neutrality and peace policy (Compare A 14,1: Russian press brings very favorable comments, emphasizes adherence to present policy).

89) C VIII 40,561 6 Oct

Noticeable relaxation of tension between Finland and Russia. (Compare A 14,49)

90) A 14,71 7 Oct

England attempts to bring about cooling off of German-Russian relationship by negotiations Cripps/Molotov.

91) A 14,15 11 Oct

German entry into Rumania: England attempts, by alarming

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reports to influence Russia's attitude toward Germany, however, no signs of change of Russian attitude noticeable.

92) A 14,214 19 Oct

According to report by the German Ambassador in Moscow, the slight deterioration of German-Russian relationship - especially caused as the result of transit of German troops through Finland - appears to have been alleviated again. "Renunciation by Moscow of interference in Balkan interests permits very well the possibilities of compensation in other areas."

93) A 14,360 30 Oct

Russia's attitude with regard to the Italian-Greek conflict (start 28 Oct) does not give rise to any anxiety. Russia will continue to form the rear protection of the Europe-bloc. Economic deliveries run according to plan. Increasing relaxation of tension between Russia/Japan.

94) A 14,361 30 Oct

"OST FALL" (East case) - this word appears for the first time in the documents (Remark of b) - in the present development of the situation is no longer considered likely. Readiness for defense and preparations in armaments continue at an increased speed nevertheless.

95) C VII/40,147 4 Nov

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer expects in case of advance in the Balkans for the support of Italy-Russia's neutrality. Question is to be talked over with Molotov in the near future. Preparations for an Eastern incident (OST FALL) are to be continued.

96) C VIII/40,111 5 Nov

Anti-British position by Moscow in the question of the Danube Commission.

97) C VIII/40,624 10 Nov

Begin of negotiations with Molotov in Berlin

98) C VII/40,162 14 Nov

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is "still inclined" to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England since there is heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare not in sight.

According to the opinion of the Naval Supreme Commander Russia will not press for a conflict within the next year, since she is in the process of building up her Navy with Germany's help - 38 cm turrets for battle ships, etc; - thus during these years she continues to be dependent upon German assistance.

99) A 15,199 16 Nov

Regarding conclusion of Molotov's visit: Satisfactory course of the negotiations. At first no fixed treaty: Russia apparently ready to join the Three Power Pact after the clarification of several further questions. In detail: Finland-

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problem: "Careful" question by Molotov in respect to annexation of Finland by Russia. German standpoint declining, but ready for concessions in respect to exploitation of Petsamo-Nickel. Poland-problem not discussed. Balkans: Notification of Molotov on contemplated German action for the support of Italy; no objections by the Russians. Molotov's suggestion to create the possibility for Russian influence in Bulgaria similar to the German one in Rumania; not entered into by the Germans; however, Germany disclosed disinterest about Turkish domination of the Dardanelles and understanding for Russian desires to own bases there; also for the regaining of the Kars-Ardahan areas from Turkey; in this sense, joint pressure on Turkey. Molotov agreeable to examination of the suggestion (compare in this connection the deviating description of this issue in the German note to Russia, 22 June 41 - T.P. of 23 June -) Iran: German disinterest; Russians very reserved on this question. Japan: Molotov ready for understanding; however, first, thorough discussion of all problems, affecting both countries.

100) A 16,110 9 Dec

It is claimed that Russia has expressed desires for guarantee in Bulgaria. Bulgarian attitude (Report of German Embassy) disinclined.

(Translation note: the following Fuehrer directive is on a separate sheet, but should follow immediately after No. 100)

100a) Documents "Barbarossa", directives by the Supreme Command, Armed Forces (File No. V, 5).
18 Dec - 1st Fuehrer directive for "Barbarossa".
It begins with the words "The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign even before the end of the war against England. (Incident before the end of the war against England. (Incident "Barbarossa") ....." "The emphasis of the commitment of the Navy will remain directed unequivocally against England during an eastern campaign."

If decided upon I shall order the assembly for action against Soviet Russia 8 weeks before the contemplated beginning of the operation.

Preparation, which need a longer period, are - in case they have not as yet been done - to be started already now, and are to be concluded by 15 May 1941.

It is to be emphasized, however, that the intention of an attack are not noticeable....."

"The final goal of the operations is the shielding against Asiatic Russia on the general line Wolga/Archangelsk ....."

"In the course of these operations /Army operations/ the Russian baltic fleet will rapidly lose its bases, and thus will no longer be able to fight...."

"All.....orders, which are given, must be designed unequivocally in such a manner that they appear as precautionary measures just in case that Russia should change her attitude towards us."

Strongest secrecy is ordered "otherwise the danger exists that by a disclosure of our preparations, the execution of which is not yet determined as far as time is concerned - most serious political and military disadvantages will result....."

/s/ ADOLF HITLER

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101) A 16,234 20 Dec

Extensive evaluation of the situation by the Chief Naval Operations (SKL): Strengthening of the English position through unfavorable development of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and because of the help from the USA demands absolute concentration against England, therefore serious doubts concerning "Barbarossa" before the defeat of England.

102) C VII/40,204 27 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic, which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval-air force construction, is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy and air force every fissure of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England. Fuehrer desires all possible advancement of submarine construction; present construction figures (12 to 18 per month) are too low. "Generally, however, the last continental enemy must be removed under all circumstances because of the present political development (Russia's leaving to mix in Balkan affairs), before he could come to grips with England. Thus the army must obtain the necessary strength. After that, full concentration on air force and navy can follow."

Thus, the Fuehrer's standpoint is contrary to that of the Naval Supreme Commander (Remark of B.)

103) A 16,302 28 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander reports in a situation conference as the Fuehrer's opinion. The political situation is changed by Russia's unreliability, as evident in the Balkan states; consequently rearmament of the army is necessary. Emphasis on navy and air force against England is not to be impaired.

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104) A 17,43 4 Jan

Roumanian government is convinced, that Russia plans the annexation of the entire Moldan area - hopes that Germany will prevent that by force of arms. Roumania's hope for the regaining of Bessarabia has not been set aside.

105) A 17,63 6 Jan

By way of Yugoslavia, it is reported that Russia attempts to influence Bulgarian foreign policy in reference to not joining the three power pact. (Compare BL.107). Generally lively, diplomatic activity by Russia in the Balkans.

(Translation note: Footnote on page 20 not legible in ink)

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106) C VII/41,6 8 Jan

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer declares; Russia's position in case of the imminent German action in Bulgaria not yet cleared. Russia needs Bulgaria for the assembly of troops against the Bosporus. Hope on USA, Russia keeps England together. Diplomatic preparation by England in Russia recognizable; England's aim is to set in motion Russian power against us. Stalin is to be regarded as an ice cold blackmailer. With USA and Russian entry into the war, very great burden for our conduct of the war. Therefore, every possibility of such a threat must be excluded from the very beginning. If the Russian threat can be removed, we can continue the fight against England under very tolerable conditions. Russia's collapse means considerable relief of burden for Japan, and increased danger for USA.

107) A 17,119 11 Jan

Signing of new, far-reaching agreements between Russia and Germany (Economical, resettlement and border questions).

108) A 17,149 12 Jan

Russian government denies foreign reports that she agrees with entry and stay of German troops in Bulgaria. Question was never mentioned by Germany to Russia. Denials given cause for concern in Bulgaria. (BL.20).

109) A 17,160 13 Jan

Russian press stresses strongly the German-Russian economic agreement, and emphasizes that the Anglo-Saxon powers would never succeed in disturbing the good relationship between the two powers.

110) A 17,214 17 Jan

Russian request for embarkation of naval commission on German heavy cruiser for training purposes for cruiser "L" was turned down by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL), because cruiser is in operational use. However, Naval Supreme Commander agrees to the participation of Russian officers in yard test voyages. (BL.361)

111) A 17,232 18 Jan

Fuehrer anticipates disturbance of the relations to Russia as the result of the Balkan operation. Fears for the Roumanian oil area.

112) A 17,255 20 Jan

Speech of Stalin: He works untiringly for the strengthening of the Russian fleet and army....."The international situation is complicated and confused and even Russia is threatened by the danger of war."

113) A 17,287 22 Jan

Declaration in the House of Commons by Under Secretary of State Butler: England has repeatedly tried during the past year, to come to closer political cooperation with Russia. Russian government has not reacted on that.

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114) A 17,324 24 Jan

In the relationship Russia-Finland again more serious difficulties now. - Measures for the protection of the Roumanian oil areas.

115) A 17,327 24 Jan

Conference Fuehrer-Duce: Statements of the Fuehrer: great importance of Finland because of nickel resources; it shall not be touched any more. - Russian complaints because of German concentration in Roumania have been received but were rejected. Purpose of the German concentration: (a) Operations against Greece, (b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey, (c) Security measure and guarantee of Roumania.....USA even in case of entry into the war not a serious danger. Greater danger, despite favorable political and economic treaties, Russia. Therefore tying down of considerable forces on the Russian border. There is no danger as long as Stalin lives...

116) A 17,359 27 Jan

Russia warns Finland that going together with any State other than Russia is causing concern.

117) A 17,401 30 Jan

Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) reports to Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) intentions for naval warfare against Russia in case of "Barbarossa".

118) C VII, 41,12 4 Feb

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander explains operational plans in a Russian incident, emphasizes especially the necessity for the seizure of Murmansk/Polarnoje, so that England cannot take a foothold there. (See also BL.47) Makes requests for support by the Air Force, and also cooperation with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Sweden.

119) A 18,34 5 Feb

Requests of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) for air support in case "Barbarossa" cannot be fulfilled completely because of lack of forces. Fuehrer points out as an especially important naval mission, rapid organization of the supply line to Leningrad.

120) A 18,32 11 Feb

According to a foreign press report, Russia is said to have told Bulgaria "she could not expect that Russia will have any further interest in her (Bulg) fate."

121) A 18,227 18 Feb FF

German reapproachment toward Russia's return of the seized Baltic ships. Measures for the protection of the west coast against English landings during "Barbarossa".
Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before "Barbarossa". Measures for the covering up of the preparations for "Barbarossa". Concentration movements against Russia are to be put forth as the "greatest undertaking of deception of the history of war, which

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serves to distract from the last preparations of the invasion against England. Even in the armed forces the impression is to be kept up that the invasion is being prepared further. Liaison contact with Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Roumania is to be made as late as possible. (Time requirement of Chief Naval Operations (SKL) compare BL.340)

122) A 18,295 23 Feb

Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of "Barbarossa" (compare BL.231).

123) A 18,319 24 Feb

Proclamation by Marshal Timoschenko: the entire Soviet nation, despite the successes of the neutrality policy must keep itself in constant readiness for the danger of an enemy surprise attack!

124) A 18,383 28 Feb F

Finnish General Staff still considers the Russian danger as very serious. Only Germany can beat Russia! -

125) C VIII/41,93 28 Feb

From the political orientation of the Atlantic forces by the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL): Russia needs for the execution of her reform plans, a period of peace of several years. Russia's foreign policy is thus marked by her will for neutrality, and avoidance of conflicts with strong opponent.

126) A 19,4 1 Mar

German march into Bulgaria.

127) A 19,39 3 Mar

Preparations of the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) for Black Sea warfare in case of Russian intervention in the Balkan war.

128) A 19,53 FF 4 Mar
C VIII/41,97

Bulgaria's consent to the German entry is disapproved in Moscow; other reports also point to a stiffening of Russian attitude because of events in the Balkans; however, a basic change of the Russian attitude is not anticipated (compare to that also the German note to Russia of 22 June 41 IV). Bulgaria joins the Axis. Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) informs the General Staff of the Army that possibilities of support for the army by naval warfare in the Black Sea in case of "Barbarossa" are only limited.

129) A 19,71 5 Mar

General Staff of the Army is also shown, upon inquiry, the difficulties of supply in the Baltic in case of "Barbarossa". According to Fuehrer directive, the emphasis of the Navy remains against England even in case "Barbarossa".

130) A 17,85 6 Mar

Issue of directive #1 for case "Barbarossa" by Chief Naval Operations (SKL).

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131) A 19,209 15 Mar

According to report from diplomatic circles, improvement of relations between Russia and England.

132) A 19,224 16 Mar

Reports from agents: Russians prepare for mobilization on the Baltic coast.

133) A 19,233 17 Mar

Signs of Russian partial mobilization noticeable on the Western border.

134) C VII/41,53 18 Mar

Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Supreme Naval Commander reports that according to a statement by Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka has grave doubts because of the Russian problem - doubts relating to Japanese entry into the war - and he recommends that Matsuoka be informed about our own intentions in respect to Russia.

135) A 19,265 19 Mar

In case of "Barbarossa", Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the Navy Chief of the Supreme Command Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult, occupation of the Finnish northern area impossible according to report Dietl (PL.20L, 20 Mar)

136) A 19,294 20 Mar

After long negotiation, Yugoslavia joins the three power pact, after restricting German concessions, German declaration of guarantee and promise of territorial gains (Exit to the Aegais) (Compare A 18,320)

137) A 19,307 22 Mar

USA press emphasizes cooling off of German-Russian relations, conviction that Russia will not let herself be drawn into war.

138) A 19,307 22 Mar

Russian-Turkish non-aggression pact in case of an attack by third power. According to C VIII/41,128, is considered as pointed at Germany.

139) A 19,344 25 Mar

Naval Attaché in Moscow points to the considerable strength of the Russian fleet built or under construction.

140) A 19,387 28 Mar FF

Overthrow of the Government and formation of an anti-German government in Yugoslavia (Compare BL. 375)
Russian request to make available German training personnel for cruiser "L". Chief Naval Operations (SKL) considers compliance feasible for military-political reasons.

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141) A 19,423 31 Mar

In the revolution in Yugoslavia American machinations are strongly involved (Russians not mentioned, compare, however, proclamation of Fuehrer dated 22 June 41, T.C. of 23 June - Remark by B.)

142) A 20,27 3 April FF

According to a Roumanian report, the impression exists that certain agreements between Russia and Yugoslavia - offer of war material ? - have influenced developments there. In Yugoslavia, rising of pan-Slavic movement. (Compare BL.13)

Balkan Operations /translators note: this is a foot note on page - 26 -: Meant by that is probably the extension of operations to Yugoslavia (Remark by B.)/ delayed "Barbarossa" at first for about 5 weeks. All measures, which can be construed as offensive actions, are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.

143) A 20,59 5 Apr

According to Roumanian diplomatic report, great anxiety in Russia about German attack, sympathy for Yugoslavia.

144) A 20,69 6 Apr C VIII/41,141

German entry into Greece, Yugoslavia. Few hours before hand conclusion of Russian-Yugoslavian pact of friendship, evaluated as clearly pointed against Germany; considered as not too important by Chief Naval Operations (SKL), since there is no common border. "Position of Russia" at the moment is one of quietness and waiting; apparently firmly decided for neutrality toward Germany (Compare German note to Russia of 22 June 41, Figure V).

145) A 20,99 8 Apr

Fear of Germany still a decisive factor of Russian policy, change in neutrality only anticipated in case of serious weakening of Germany; but increasing coolness unmistakable. (Compare BL.113, 9 April)

146) A 20,125 10 Apr

Russian war council, under Timoshenko: State of emergency and increased military preparations for all units on the Western front.

147) A 20,151 12 Apr

Russian attitude still not clear toward Balkan development, which is being regarded with dissatisfaction. - Economically cooperative as before. Signing of a new oil delivery treaty.

148) A 20,173 13 Apr

Conclusion neutrality pact Russia/Japan.

149) A 20,219 10 Apr

German Balkan successes lead to the "return of Russia to the previous correct attitude". Conclusion of Russian-Japanese

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pact "shows failure of the Anglo-American attempt to activate Russia against the three powers of the pact". English attempts, however, are being continued (BL.252). Russian attitude toward Germany further improved, however, military preparations on the Russian border proceed.

150) C VII/41,70 20 Apr

Naval Supreme Commander with Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka's visit, and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact (14 April). Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, "that Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself." Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladisvostok, and to cause her to attack Singapore. Above standpoint of the Fuehrer has effected Russia's position favorably, who is now behaving very correctly and does not expect an attack.

Naval Supreme Commander asks "what opinion the Fuehrer has about the presently recognizable new Russian change of mind in a decisive pro-German sense".
Fuehrer replies as above.

151) A 20,295 21 Apr

Relief of tension Russia-Finland (by Russia's giving in BL.315). Russia at present eager to avoid every incident.

152) A 20,341 24 Apr

Naval Attaché in Moscow reports considerable extent of rumors: danger of war Germany-Russia, fed by transient travellers from Germany. English Ambassador predicts as day of outbreak of war 22 June! -

153) A 20,354 25 Apr

According to the declarations in the English House of Commons, no great progress in the improvement of Anglo-Russian relations; English efforts will be continued.

154) A 20,413 29 Apr

Moscow radio reports landing of four German transports with 12,000 men in Finland.

155) A 21,1 1 May

Proclamations by Stalin and Timoshenko on account of first of May, show that Russia is striving with all means at her disposal to keep out of the war, and on account of the fluid international to prepare for any eventualities. Further urgent war preparations and measures for the protection of the Russian western border (BL.14).

156) A 21,13 2 May

According to English press, Anglo-Russian negotiations for the conclusion of a political treaty have failed.

157) A 21,30 3 May

According to a report of the Naval Attaché in Moscow, no conspicuous or more extensive military preparations visible. (Compare, however, report by Ambassador BL.141).

158) A 21,51 5 May

English radio speaks of stronger indication of German attack on Russia.

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159) A 21,66 6 May

Appointment of Stalin as chairman of the council of people's commissioners; according to the Chief Naval Operations (Skl) this means: concentration of the entire executive power, strengthening of the government authority and "desire to continue the present foreign policy, avoidance of conflict with Germany."

160) A 21,28 7 May

The appointment of Stalin is evaluated in neutral countries - even in the USA - as an indication of closer cooperation with Germany and of an all-inclusive agreements between Germany and Russia.

161) A 21,125 10 May

Moscow withdraws diplomatic recognition from the Norwegian, Belgians, Yugoslavian representations (apparently a friendly gesture toward Germany) - compare BL.156. In the opinion of the Naval Attaché Stalin "the bearer of German-Soviet cooperation"!

161a) A 21,235 17 May

Evaluation of Russian policy in Turkish diplomatic circles: Russia wants to satisfy Germany by the last Russian declaration, by the expulsion of the diplomats of territories, occupied by the Germans, and above all, by extensive deliveries, and also to relieve all doubts on the political scene. One can count on a new German-Russian understanding, for the purpose of which Stalin took over the office of prime-minister! - (Report from the Embassy)

162) C VII/41,162 22 May

Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Supreme Naval Commander declares all preparations for the holding back of the war materials consigned to Russia have been made. In the near future it will be explained to the Russian navy that, because of our own need, there may be small delays in the deliveries, without endangering the whole. Fuehrer agrees..

163) A 21,439 29 May

Begin of the preparatory warship movements for "Barbarossa".

164) A 21,454 30 May

demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 division is needed for that; "This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London"! Chief Naval Operations (Skl) agrees completely, and expresses himself in the same manner as stated below under No. 168.

165) A 22,29 4 June

Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia. Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany.

166) A 22,31 4 June

On suggestion of the commander of the submarines (B.d.V). Most economic use of submarines in the Baltic in case "Barbarossa"; bright nights; no unnecessary use for operations where Navy is not deciding; instead full use against England.

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167) A 22,53 6 June

Ambassador in Moscow reports..... Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly - as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany as good.

168) C VII/41,173 6 June

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations (Skl) Observation on the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war: This memorandum was presented to the Fuehrer by Naval Supreme Commander according to BL.124 in heavily condensed form and was submitted apparently mainly for the purpose of increased Italian conduct of the war in the Mediterranean; it represents one of the most important documents of the war records. It is yet to be determined whether and to which offices in the Fuehrer's headquarters, it was submitted. The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the near east. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present favorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the near east with help from the USA. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly, demands, however, that the undertaking "Barbarossa" "which because of the magnitude of its aims, naturally stands in the foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces leadership, must under no circumstances bear to an abandonment, diminishing a delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean." (BL.176). It states furthermore that, despite the strain on the German armed forces by the operation "Barbarossa", the complete operational exploitation of the great successes achieved lately "must be carried out at a time when the help of the USA for England has not as yet attained a decisive extent. (BL.179). In a note of the Chief First Naval District (1/Skl) of 18 Aug. 43, it says in this connection: "At that time, it was also the conviction of the Chief Naval Operations (Skl), that the war against Russia was inevitable, after Stalin had proved himself as a blackmailer by his behaviour (Baltic States, Bessarabia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria). (Pencilled marginal note: Thus the Chief Naval Operations (Skl) did not know the real extortions?) About on 15 June the Fuehrer, in a dinner speech of 1½ hours, explained in the presence of all the higher commanders of the armed forces, in all inclusive, convincing explanation, that the eastern campaign was inevitable, and that we therefore must conduct it in a preventative and offensive manner to avoid that the Russians could overrun us at a later time after longer appropriate preparations, when we are tied down in other sectors.-" Certainly, the opinion which the Chief, Naval Operations (Skl) then had has been decisively influenced by the generally spread confidence that the campaign against Russia could be completed victoriously in a few months. - (Remark by B.)

169) A 22,65 7 June

From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow..... All observations show, that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behaviour of the government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany, prove the same thing.

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170) A 22,121 12 June

London expects a fundamental change of German-Russian relations and seen a German explanation on the development of German-Russian relations.

171) A 22,123 12 June

Directive of Chief, Naval Operations (Skl) to prevent German commercial ships, destined for Russian ports, from leaving by a fictious reason.

172) A 22,138 13 June

According to Finnish reports, for the first time Russian patrol activity at the Western exit of the Gulf of Finland.

173) C VIII/41,247 14 June

Official declaration by the Russian Tass-agency, which turns against rumors of the coming German-Russian war; emphasizes conscientious fulfillment of the pact by both parties -- The declaration is evaluated by the German side, as an attempt to make Germany as the aggressor in case of a possible attack. (Compare A 22,149)

174) A 22,151 14 June

Speech by the Fuehrer before the highest armed forces of the commands about the background and intended execution of "Barbarossa" (compare No. 168, memorandum by the Chief, First Naval District (1/Skl)

175) A 22,154 14 June

Further Russian security measures in the Gulf of Finland. (Compare BL.205, 235)

176) A 22,161 15 June

Enemy and neutral press discuss tension in the German-Russian relationship. Some consider immediate impending German advance as inevitable. Compare BL.172: Stalin prepared to extreme concessions: leading army circles against further policy of compliance.

177) A 22,165 15 June

On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations (Skl) (Compare BL.218,236) use of arms against Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.

178) A 22,179 16 June

Permission of veiled aerial observation of the operational area for "Barbarossa" by Chief, Naval Operations (Skl); violations of neutrality are to be avoided under all circumstances.

179) A 22,188 17 June

Directive of Chief, Naval Operations (Skl), that naval war measures in the case of "Barbarossa" are to be directed in such a way that the main emphasis of the use lies still in the warfare against England. Aim of the Baltic naval warfare to paralyze the enemy by our own initiative to avoid large own losses, and to increase our own freedom of movement. The lifespan of the Russian fleet depends after all on the progress of land operations.

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180) A 22,195 17 June

Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) confirms "D" day 22 June.

181) A 22,203 18 June

On proposal of Chief Naval Operations (Skl), directive of the Air force, Supreme Commander, that Russian ships and port installations are to be spared during aerial attacks.

182) A 22,243 20 June

The Admiral South-East receives directive from the Chief Naval Operations (Skl) that the Black Sea missions are absolutely defensive, since Roumania, at first, is not to be considered as being in a state of war.

183) A 22,258 21 June

Reconnaissance of the Baltic theater of operations shows Russian readiness, laying of mine barriers, but no striking movements, no symptoms that Russians are set for imminent German operations. Apparently, battle ships still continue target practice! -

184) The contemplated German offensive mine barriers were laid according to plan, apparently unnoticed, the German submarines are in alert positions and assembling, also the S-flettilas. All shipping will be stopped from 2000 hours on.

185) A 22,267 22 June

Begin of hostilities against Russia.
Our own operations were not disturbed by the enemy, although they are taking place in his immediate vicinity. The outbreak of hostilities has stimulated movements and activity of Russian Naval forces only moderately. Symptom of energetic offensive reaction against the German attack cannot be recognized on the evening of the first day on the enemy's side.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-170

18 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., Inf. O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpt of Document No. C-170.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1332102

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page 13 his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the FUHRER refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment could not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41 provided another opportunity of combating England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which in its turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.

In the measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, North Africa became more
page 14 and more a German theatre of war. Employing our forces in this way - incidentally, no great force was involved - appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea-transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space" (LEBENSRAUM).

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the unnecessary expedition of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our partwhich - taking a long view of the matter - would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the NORTH was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country.

page 15 12. Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East - that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the FUHRER himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position madeit at all possible.

13. Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of CRETE; this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory - a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1124 - 0053

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Headquarters
12 November 40
2F 408

WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K.Chefs

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55

Directive No. 18

The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:-

1) Relations with France.

The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power":-she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the deGaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.

For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on - apart from the current work of the armistice commission - entirely by the foreign office (Auswartiges Amt) in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW).

More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.

2) Spain and Portugal.

Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of German intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:

a) Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
b) The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.

The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:

Section I.

a) Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.

b) Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.

c) The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).

With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.

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Section II

a) Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favorable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.

b) Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.

Section III

a) Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.

b) Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.

Section IV

Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.

As for the strength of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:

Army

The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.

Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominantly of a mobile nature.

Air Force

Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibraltar to guarantee substantial success.

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.

Navy

Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.

To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of single coastal batteries.

An Italian participation is not envisaged.

As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the Atlantic Islands (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

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H1124 - 0054

I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.

3) Italian Offensive against Egypt.

If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Morsa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:-

Army

Holding an armored division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).

Navy

Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.

Air Force

Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.

4) Balkans.

The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.

In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.

The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.

Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition) are to be given favorable treatment.

5) Russia

Political discussions have been intiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

444-PS

H1124-0055

H1124 - 0056

Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.

6) Landing in England

Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seelowe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavor to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.

7) I shall expect the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.

signed: ADOLF HITLER

initialled: Jodl

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 444-PS

15 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 444-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

444-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs.

The Fuehrer's Headquarters
18 December 40

SECRET
only through officer

9 copies
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Directive Nr. 21

Case Barbarossa

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick compaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa)

For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

For the Eastern campaign the Airforce will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.

Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intented beginning of operations

Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.

The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:

I. General Purpose:

The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.

Effective intervention by the Russian Airforce is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.

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H1124 - 0057

II. Probable Allies and their tasks.

. . . . . .

(Page 4, Par. II).

2.) It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.

. . . . . .

(Page 8, Par. IV).

IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders in chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are precautionary measures, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not been fixed) will become known and thereby gra. political and military disadvantages would result.

V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders in chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.

Signed by Hitler

and initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 446-PS

6 November 1945.

I, ALFRED BREINER, XO46349, (CIVILIAN), hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 446-PS.

ALFRED BREINER
XO46349
(CIVILIAN)

446 PS

H1124 - 0058

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit USA 135
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TOP SECRET

Top Secret
Only thru officer

OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff
Section L (IV/Qu)
44125/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941
5 copies
4th copy

Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940

Directives for Special Areas

To Order #21

(Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of Operations and executive power

1) The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.

It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.

2) The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:

a) The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b) In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

c) As soon as th area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its geneal ogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

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H1124-0059

H1124-0060

3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks,

a) Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
b) Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4)
c) Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.
d) Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.
e) Traffic regulations.
f) Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.

The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.

4) The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rü Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/WiRüAmt.

5) The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense.

6) The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.

II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:

7) Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.

8) As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him

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H1124-0061

shall decide on exceptions.

Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.

III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.

10) Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights.

Further orders in this shall be issued later.

11) Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:

Procurement of food and feed.
Housing and machinery.
Purchase and the shipment of merchandise.
Procurement of funds and wage-control.
Salaries.
Request for indemnity-payments.
Postal and telegraph services.
Traffic.
Jurisdiction.

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.

IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

12) Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
signed: KEITEL

Distribution:

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Section L	5th copy

(Translator's note: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense = Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab/Abt. Landesverteidigung)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 447-PS

16 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 447-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

447-PS

Exhibit USA 143
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

H1124-0062

p. 1.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 865-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

I name Reichsleiter Alfred R o s e n b e r g as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region.

An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby ertrusted to him.

The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellory Treasury in a lump sum.

Fuehrer's Headquarters 20th April 1941.

The Fuehrer
signed Adolf Hitler.

Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellory
signed Dr. Lammers.

The Reich Minister and the Head of the
Reich Chancellory

Berlin W8 21st April
1941
Vossstrasse 6
At present Fuehrer
Headquarters, mail
without exception to
be sent to the Berlin
address.

To:
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
General Field Marshal Keitel .

TOP SECRET

Personal. By curier.

My dear General Field Marshal.

Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest coopration of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities ... to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose co-operation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. There are: the Commissioner for the Four Year plan, the Reich Minister of Economies and you yourself.

Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes, to place your co-operation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in the carrying out of the task imposed upon him.

It is recommended in the interests of secrecy, that you name a representative in your office, with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual reputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.

I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.

Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely
Dr. Lammers.

865 PS

H1124 - 0063

The Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.

25. April 1941.

Most Secret.
By curier.

To:
The Head of the Reich Chancellory,
Reich Minister Dr. Lammers.

Personal.

Dear Reich Minister.

I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff as my permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy.

Heil Hitler.
Yours very sincerely
K.
25/4.

The Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces.

25th April 1941.

Most Secret.
By curier.

To:
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
Personal.

Dear Reichsleiter,

The Head of the Reich Chancellory has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with the solving of these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him only.

Heil Hitler,
Yours very sincerely
K. 25/4.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 865-PS

November 23, 1945.

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 865-PS.

EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371.

865 PS

H1124-0064

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 872-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

Exhibit USA 134
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

Most Secret

Armed Forces Ops Staff 3.2.41.

S. O. only
Access only through officer

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44089/41 Most Secret S. O. only

Conference of "Fall Barbarossa" and Sonnenblume.

The following persons attended.

The Fuehrer
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
C-in-C Army
Chief of the Army General Staff
Chief of Army Op. section
Colonel Schmundt
Major Christian
Major Engel

Chief of Army General Staff

1) Enemy strength approximately 100 Infantry divisions (JD) 25 Cavalry divisions, approximately 30 mechanized divisions.

Our own strength about the same, far superior in quality.

In estimating the leading personalities, Timosher is the only outstanding figure. The only one, that, is, according to Gen. Koestring.

Details of the strength and organisation of the Russian divisions are [illegible] only in that even the Infantry Divisions include a comparitively large number of tanks, though the material is bad and merely thrown together.

In the case of mechanized divisions, we have superiority with regard to tanks, weapons (Schuetzen) and artlery. The Russians are superior in numbers, we in quality.

The Russians are normally equipped im artillery. Materials likewise inferior. The Command of the Artillery is insufficient. The Russian Operational intentions are unknown. Strong forces are at the fronier. Any retreat could be only on a small scale since the Baltic States and and Ukraine are vital to the Russians for supply reasons. Fortification work is in progress especially on the North and Southern flanks.

There is no fresh imformation on the communications system.

Directives to Army Groups so given that the Russian front will be split imto 2 sections and a Russian retreat on the Dnjeper-Duena Mine prevented.

The Army Group North and Centre ordered to press forward across the Duena in a north-easterly direction wit concentrated armoured forces iin 3 armoured groups (the strongest in the South).

872-PS

The most northerly group is to press on up to the region of Lake Peipus, then advance further to the East in cooperation with the other two armoured groups, who will be attacking Smolensk.

The Army Group South is to advance across the Dneper in a south-easterly direction. Army Group North and Centre is to carry out operations North of the Pripet Marshes. Army Group South will be to the South, that is, separate and independent. The main sector lies in the North, army reserves are massed there.

6 armoured divisions are required from the Marita operation; of thes the 2 training divisions are for the 1st line, a further 2 from Roumania itself for the Southern Group, the last 2 divisions as reserves for the Northern Group. It all depends on the Balkan situation (Turkey's attitude).

Fuehrer — When the die has been cast, the Turks will not make anyfurther moves. No special protection of the Balkans is therefor necessary. One dangerous moment will be if North Africa is cleared by the British, thus enabling the British to operate in Syria with unhampered forces.

Chief of Army General Staff — Northern Group 50 divs, 13 armoured divs, 9 motorized divs. Attac
Southern Group 30 divs, 5 armoured divs, 3 motorized divs. Force

In addition : Surpreme Command of the Army Reserves.

The assigning of Pioneers is not entirely satisfactory. This is made good by additional bridge-building units (Brueckenmaterial).

H1124 - 0065

Fuehrer — agreed with the large dispositions.

Chief of Army General Staff — It is proposed to isolate a large number of Russian troops in various places, at the time the split is effected. The early use of reserves is necessery for this purpose. ... ...
Note: The Pripet Marshes are not definitely tabu.

Fuehrer — mentioned the Russians tactics of flank attacks.

Chief of Army General Staff — The cavalry divisions are particularly dangerous in this respect.

Orders issued to date:
Orders for Army Group are binding
Orders for Armies set out the targets
Orders for Units leave possibility for changes.

He expounded on the orders issued to Army groups etc. up to the present.

Fuehrer — mentioned that the operational areas were enormous, that the enemy troops could be successfully encircled, only if the encirclement were complete (Cavalry divisions). (At the moment, there is a very biassed play on in Moscow about Suwarow). The immediate surrender of the Baltic States, including Leningrad and the Ukraine cannot be expected at once. It is, however, possible that, after the initial defeat, the Russians, knowing our operational aims, will retreat on large scale and prepare for defende further East behind some barrier.

In this case, the North, regardless of the Russians in the East, will be cleared. From there, (a favourable supply-

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base) a thrust in the rear of the Russians without a frontal attack. It is essential to wipe out large sections of the enemy and not to put them to flight. This will be accomplished if we occupy the flanking areas with the strongest possible forces. Then, with the enemy held in the centre, he can be manoeuvred out of it from the flanks.

Chief of Army General Staff

The Falkenhorst army can advance on Petsamo with 1½ divisions, by using Swedish railways, with a further 1½ divisions (including 1 SS Brigade). The aim is the protection of the Finnish northern industrial area, trapping and cutting off the Murmansk forces.

The Finns will probably make a strategic concentration in the South with 4 Army Corps (Aks) of which an attacking group of 5 divisions will advance in the direction of Leningrad, with 3 divisions against Lake Onegin, 2 divisions against Hangö they need strong support. There are 15 Russian divisions on the Finnish front, approximately 1 division in Murmansk.

Führer

assumed that Sweden would join with us at a price. The price: the Aaland Islands (not our possessions). There is no question of a union between Finnland and Sweden as this would not suit the European New Order.

Norway must be under protection, no repercussions are desired from that quarter. Artillery reinforcements are required.

In the South: The most important task is the protection of the oil fields, therefore speedy action from Roumania is necessary.

Chief of Army General Staff

Position of Hungary. If Hungary is not to participate, we must withdraw from Hungary. The destination of the march will be given as Roumania. At the last minute the direction will change towards the Russian frontier. Hungary will permit anything so long as she is given the corresponding political assurances. Agreements with all states taking part (with the exception of Roumania) can be made only at the eleventh hour. With Roumania it is a matter of life and death.

Chief of Army General Staff

Armoured reconnaissance forces are still scarce.

Flak question is still unsettled, it depends on the conditions of the roads (to follow in writing).

The Air Force commands 30 Flak battalions, in addition 30 batteries set up by the Army.

The Navy must hasten the opening of supply routes to the Baltic.

Supply is a road transport problem as the gauge has to be changed on the railroads here. A system of long-distance trucks, which can bring supplies to supply-bases.

Agreement with the Air Force that all transport is to be used to the full.

Supply-areas, shifted to the region of East Poland, are at present being developed. (Possibilities in Roumania are still being explored).

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In connection with Marita, the difficulties of transporting back those forces urgently needed for Barbarossa were stressed.

The intended time period was discussed with a plan.

1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel) transfer now, Front-Germany - East
2nd " " " from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. 3 deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained.

In industry the full capacity time table is in force. No more camouflage.

From 25.IV - 15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seelöwe can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognisable.

The full capacity time table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.

C-in-C Army requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.

Führer When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.

Chief of the Air Force General Staff joined the conference.

Führer discussed the Italian situation in the Mediterranean.

He stated that the loss of North Africa could be withstood in the military sense but must have a strong psychological effect on Italy.

Britain can hold a pistol to Italy's head and force her either to make peace and retain everything or after the loss of North Africa to be bombarded. This would be to our disadvantage. British forces in the Mediterranean area will not be tied down. We ourselves have a weak base there through Southern France. The British have the free use of a dozen divisions and can employ them most dangerously, i.e. in Syria.

We must make every effort to prevent this. Italy must be given support.

We are already doing this in Marita. We must, however, attempt to render effective assistance in North Africa.

The Italians are of the opinion that they can put up a defence now only at Tripoli. This is not feasible. The Air Force cannot operate there. Therefore the position cannot be held. There must be some larger protection zone. Our blocking units can also be effective only in larger protection zones.

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He discussed the connection between successes, even defensive successes there and Balkan events, possibly a peaceful settlement in the Balkans.

What can be done?

Land units will arrive late even if not too late. Graziani must receive some kind of support. Therefore the Air Force must be employed if possible with Stuka groups.with' jumping-off bases and home-fields in Lybia.

If this can bring the British advance to a standstill, the intended blocking unit is still insufficient and must be reinforced by a mobile unit (strong armoured division).

The British personnel and material must have been exhausted during the advance. If the British encounter fresh and well-equipped German forces, the situation will soon alter.

Query from C-in-C Army. Can we spare an armoured division for this?

C-in-C Army unwillingly from Marita.

Führer out of the question.

C-in-C Army If it comes to that, Barbarossa is also in need.

Führer If we send help to North Africa, we must do so at once before the Italians. (We have made the offer to the Italians).

The primary consideration is: can the Air Force intervene now.

The time required for the transport of Air Force supplies, blocking unit and armoured divisions must be established at once.

Then, what are the climatic conditions?

C-in-C Army It is important that British supplies by land and sea are stopped. This can be done only by the German Air Force.

Führer The Italians must be asked how long they can allow for the transport of the above mentioned German troops.

If necessary, transport groups must be employed.

Proposal: General Jeschonek III/KG for special duties, from Foggia.

C-in-C Army proposed that the blocking unit should first be reinforced by 1 armoured regiment. The rest to follow. The Führer agreed.

Chief of Air Force General Staff spoke of the position of the ground-organisation in North Africa. Only in Benghazi are Stuka-Forces ready within range for operations.

Fighter forces will naturally be sent there also, or Italian fighters be placed under German orders.

It is most important that the air base of Malta be subdued.

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Führer agreed. The Italians are to withdraw Italian fighters from the Channel coast (He will speak to the Duce).

The Air Force must test immediately, the possibilities of intervening in North Africa. The Army is to see to the transport for the blocking unit.

The transport must be speeded up. Reinforcement by an armoured regiment, further reinforcement up to an armoured division will be withdrawn from Marita. Flak forces on ahead.

C-in-C Army proposed a united command of all mobile forces under 1st General Headquarters. Cooperation with the Air Force which also commands the Italian naval air forces.

Conclusions:

1). Barbarossa

a). The Führer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.

b). The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.

c). Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Mokdau.

d). It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila. (auxiliary measure)

e). The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seelöwe and the subsidiary measure Marita.

2). Sonnenblume

a). The Air Force must intervene as soon as possible with Stuka and Fighter forces. Bases and jumping-off bases in accordance with decisions made in North Africa.
It is desired that the Italian fighter forces be placed under German orders.

b). The 10th Flieger Korps is to take over the task of protecting the transports to East Africa, in the closest cooperation with the Italian Air Force and Naval Commander in Catania.

c). The 10th FliegerKorps is to strike a strong blow against the British troops in Cyrenaica as soon as possible. (with the use of the heaviest bombs)

The main task is to disrupt British supplies by land and sea, next, to combat the British fleet.

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First of all, attempts must be made to subdue the air base of Malta.

d). The Army is to continue the transport of the blocking unit. This is, however, to be reinforced at once with armour. Preparations for adding one Armoured Division, (II Staffel from Marita). Flack forces on ahead. 1st General Headquarters to be established immediately. United German Supreme Command over all mobile forces will be proposed to the Italians.

Distribution:

Chef L
I H
I K
I L
IV

Certified

- - - - - -(illegible)

Captain

- - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 872-PS

7 November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/O, W.R.N.S., 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 872-PS.

ESME SHERRIFF
2/O, W.R.N.S.
36482

872 PS

Exhibit USA 137
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

H1124-0071

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOC. NO. 873 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

L IV/Qu

Top Secret

Führer's Hq., 1 May 1941

For senior Officers only
Only by officer

1 original copy.

Conference with Chief "L" on the 30 April 1941

1) Timetable Barbarossa:

The Führer has decided:
Action Barbarossa begin 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves have not yet reached the appointed areas.

2) Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa:

Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength
Sector Middle: Great German superiority

Sector South: Russian superiority

3) Russian strategic concentration:

Continued movements of strong forces to the German-Russian boundary.

4) Estimate by the Supreme Commander of the Army of course Barbarossa will take.

Presumably violent battles of the frontiers, duration up to 4 weeks. In course of the following development weaker resistance may be expected.

Opinion of Russian soldiers

A Russian will fight, on appointed spot, up to the last breath.

5) Conversations with Finland are approved by the Führer according to the OKW WFST part II Op. 44594/41 g.K. Chefs. of the 28 April 1941.

6) Conversations with Hungary are only possible in the last third of May. The Führer believes the Hungarians will be prepared to carry out defensive operations on the Russian border, but they will not allow any German attack from Hungary.

7) Conversations with Roumania will be possible only at a very advanced date.

8) Concealment of conversations with friendly countries: projected German assault in the West, hence Eastern Front must be covered. Participation of friendly countries only as a purely defensive measure.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT NO. 873 PS

21.11.45

I, CHARLES E. BIDWELL, S/Sgt, 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of excerpt of Doc. No. 873 PS

CHARLES E. BIDWELL

873 PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 874-PS
OFFIECE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

Top Secret

The Chief of the
Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces.

Hq.of the Fuehrer 9 March 41

DRAFT

Honorable Reich Minister!
(TODT)

For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the organization Todt.

(Initials of)
Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 874-PS

I, WALTER SELIGSON, 1st Lt., 01558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 874-PS.

WALTER SELIGSON
1st Lt.
01558904

874-PS

Exhibit USA 142
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

Copy

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1017-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Handwritten note 1. Memorandum

3.4.41

Subject: The USSR.

Bolshevik Russia, just as the one-time Czarist Russia, is a conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has come into being through the annexation of states of a related or even of an essentially alien character.

A military conflict with the USSR. will result in an extraordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large section of the USSR. It is very probable that military action on our part will very soon be followed by the military collapse of the USSR. The occupation of these areas would then present not so many military as administrative and economic difficulties. Thus arises the first question:

Is the occupation to be determined by purely military and/or economic needs, or is the laying of political foundations for a future organisation of the area also a factor in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If so, it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to be attained, for it will, without doubt, also have an affect on military operations.

If the Political overthrow of the Eastern Empire, in the weak condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military operations, one may conclude that:

1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions;

2) From the very beginning, the treatment of individual sections of territory should, as regards administration, as well as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends we are striving to attain;

3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast areas, such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies for the continuation of the war against England, the maintenance of production which this necessitate and the great directives for the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with all together in one place.

It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the arguments which follow of course only hold good once the supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been assured.

Anyone who knows the East, sees in a map of Russia's population the following national or geographical units:

a) Greater Russia with Moscow as its centre.

b) White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital.

c) Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

d) The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its centre.

e) The Don area with Rostov as its capital.

f) The area of the Caucasus.

g) Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan.

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A. Greater Russia

After the rule of the Tartars, the Russian Empire, Czarist in character developed out of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. This nucleus area possesses even today the greatest driving power. The political aim of operations against the USSR, therefore, would be the permanent weakening of this area, in order to secure possibilities of expansion for the other areas. By means of a temporary occupation of this area, this weakening could be brought about in a way comprising the three following measures:

1) the total destruction of the Jewish Bolshevik state administration, without helping to set up a new and comprehensive state system;

2) very extensive utilisation of economic resources, such as the removal of all non-essential stocks, mechanical installations, and, in particular, of any available means of transport, small river craft etc. etc.;

3) the allocation of considerable sections of this Russian nucleus territory to the fresh administrative units which are to be formed, as, in particular, to White Russia, the Ukraine, and the Don territory.

In this way all other areas would be offered at the same time the possibility of making extensive use of that part of Russia controlled by Moscow as a dumping ground for undesirable elements of the population.

B. White Russia

White Russia comprises a part of the USSR which is very backward culturally as well as economically. At the same time it contains the second largest Jewish community in the USSR, with towns which are completely Jewish, such as Bjalostok, Minsk, Polodzk, Vitebsk, and others besides.

The awakening of an independent life, and the setting up of a living state system must be considered as an extremely tedious and difficult undertaking. White Russia is far more backward in culture than, for instance, Lithuania, and more exploited by the Jews than Poland. Nevertheless, having regard to the necessity of weakening the Russian nucleus area, such an attempt should be advocated.

The USSR has confined White Russia to the area between the Polish North-West frontier and approximately as far as the Pronja. But the real capital of the whole area would be Smolensk. The half administrative district of the same name and also a section of the administrative district of Kalinin (formerly Twer) could count, by population, as belonging to it, or could be added to it for administration purposes. In this way the frontier of White Russia would be moved forward to within about 250 kilometres of Moscow.

If the creation of independent political life is considered desirable, it would not be advisable to carve up this area to the benefit of the Generalgouvernement of Poland.

C. Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania

In the case of these areas the question arises, whether they should be allotted the special task of becoming a German settlement area of the future, the racially most suitable elements being assimilated.

If this is set up as an aim, the areas also require very special treatment in the general task.

The necessary removal of considerable sections of the intelligentsia particulary Latvian ones - to the Russian nucleus area would have to be organised. The settlement of a German rural population in considerable quantities

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would have to be started - possibly a large contingent of German settlers suitable for this purpose could be taken from among the Volga Germans, after the undesirable elements have been eliminated. There might also be the possibility of the settlement of Danes, Norwegians, Dutch and - after the war has been brough to a victorious end - of Englishmen too, so that, in the course of one or two generations, this area can be joined up with the German nucleus area as a new Germanised country.

In this case we should also not have to neglect to deport considerable groups of racially inferior sections of the population from Lithuania.

D. The Ukraine (Border territory)

Kiev became the main centre of the Varangian state with its superimposed Scandinavian character. But even after the rule of the Tartars Kiev was for a long time diametrically opposed to Moscow. Its independent national life is based, contrary to the assertions of Muscovite historians, whose ideas also dominated the whole of European learning, on a tradition which is really almost unbroken.

As far as this area is concerned, the political task would be the encouragement of independent national life until, possibly, an independent state could be created, with the object, alone or in conjunction with the Don area and the Caucasus as a Black Sea Union, of holding Moscow constantly in check and ensuring Lebensraum for Greater Germany to the East. In the economic field, however, this area would at the same time, have the task of forming a powerful base for raw materials and a supplementary nutrition centre for the Greater German Reich.

Strips of border territory from the Russian nucleus area, too, would have to be added to that part which is regarded by the USSR as purely Ukrainian - as has already been mentioned - in order to weaken this nucleus area and at the same time to keep alive constant opposition to it. In this matter, parts of the administrative districts of Kursk and Voronesch might be possibilities.

The administrative and economic handling of the whole area would then have to be directed towards the attainment of this political aim.

E. The Don area

It is inhabited by the Don Cossacks. As a nation they are far less independent than the Ukrainians, culturally they are saturated with Moscow ideology, and politically they tend chiefly towards Moscow, but are more developed than the White Russians. The task in this area would be similar to that in White Russia.

Similarly, it would be desirable to extend this area Northwards up to the Administrative Districts of Szaratow in order to link up its administration with that of the territory of the Volga Germans.

F. The Caucasus

The Caucasus is inhabited by sections of the population which are, racialllly, entirely different, and also by national units. The river plain of the Kuban and Terek, and the present Administrative Districts of Krasnodar and Ordschjonokidze are inhabited by Cossacks, the majority of whom consider themselves to be Ukrainians. The most advanced nation as regards culture is the Georgians, between the Great and Lesser Caucasus, who can point to a centuries old cultural tradition and independence of their own. Then comes Aserbeidschan, peopled by Muselmen of Ugrotatarian origin, with its centre at Baku. The Armenians live in adjacent territory to the South, while the Northern mountain slopes are inhabited by quite a number of mountain peoples of the most varied origins.

. The area is Russia's oil centre. The material output, and indeed the existence of the other mainly agricultural areas of the USSR, such as the Ukraine, the Don-Kuban, and the Terek district, and also to a certain extent the Russian nucleus area, largely depend on keeping this area in production. Owing to the introduction of the Bolshevik system of running villages on communal lines without individual ownership, and of Kolchoses, (collective farms) with mechanical cultivation of the soil, the production of grain and food depends on the regular supplying of the necessary fuel. As a result of the sharp drop in the number of draught cattle, and the fact that these are, numerically, very unevenly distributed, any strangulation of the oil supply - quite apart from the maintenance of the motor repair depots and the holding ready of the necessary servicing personnel for this, - tends to famine.

G. Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan

We can assume that, after the military collapse of the Soviets in Europe, very small forces would be needed to dispose of the Moscow tyranny in Central Asia. This area too, is inhabited by peoples of very different types, mainly Turano-Mongoloid, and who are followers of Mohammed. They feel themselves to be in long-standing racial and religious opposition to the Soviets, and at the same time to the Russian people too, without being able, for the time being, to throw off the Russian yoke by their own efforts. This should not be considered too difficult to carry out, however, with German help, and in view of the confusion which would arise among the Soviets.

The area is Russia's cotton store, with an annual production, according to Bolshevik figures, of 4 - 500,000 tons of cotton.

The entry of Germans into Central Asia would mean powerful rear support for Iran and Afghanistan. It is a matter for conjecture whether these states would not possibly be impelled by this means to undertake more active operations against India, - if there is any such intention, - in the event of Turkey too, having altered her attitude by that time. The threat to the British lines of communication to India thus acquires real significance, and will, without doubt, compel Britain to deploy greater forces in this area, which she would have to take from Europe or elsewhere.

General Questions of Economy from the Legal Angle

The acquiring of the oil, mainly in the Caucasus, immediately brings with it the question of its transport, in order to maintain agricultural production in the occupied areas. The question of transport, however, which is of decisive importance to the cultivation of the soil, is bound up again with the settling of the coal problem. At the same time, the question of finance in these areas appears of primary importance.

A question which likewise affects all areas is that of the almost complete abolition, under the Soviet system, of private property. It is not improbable that this question will have practical consequences immediately the area is occupied. Spontaneous action taken by a completely uneducated rural population, if and when they dissolve the Kolchoses by their own efforts, could result in untold material harm.

For this reason these problems require to be settled, not regionally, but as extraordinary matters for all areas, and local variations, and perhaps also differing tactical action could easily be combined with this.

Summary

The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from the points briefly outlined here:

1) the creation of a central department for the occupied areas

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of the USSR, to be confined more or less to war-time.

Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich authorities, it would be the task of this department -

a) to issue binding political instructions to the separate administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at the time and the goal which is to be achieved.

b) to secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from all the occupied areas.

c) to make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying out, in main outline, of the primarily important questions for all areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport, and the production of oil, coal and food;

2) the carrying out of sharply defined decentralisation in the separate administration areas, grouped together by race or by reason of political economy, for the carrying out of the totally dissimilar tasks assigned to them.

As against this, an administrative department, regulating matters in principle, and to be set up on a purely economic basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be inadequate, and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, dictated only by economic considerations, and this might impede the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even prevent it.

The question therefore arises, whether the opinions which have been set forth should not, purely for reasons of expediency, be taken into consideration from the very beginning when organising the administration of the territory on a basis of war economy. In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties of administration which arise from that alone, and also in view of the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which are totally different from those of Western Europe, the whole question of the USSR would require different treatment from that which has been applied in the individual countries of Western Europe.

2.4.41

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1017-PS

25 October 1945

I, PETER FRASER, Capt. K.R.R.C., 76538, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1017-PS.

PETER FRASER
Capt. K.R.R.C.
76538

1017-PS

H1124 - 0078

Exhibit U.S.A. 145
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1029-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Instruction

for a Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia (Ostland)

Instruktion

für einen Reichskommissar im Ostland

All the regions between Narwa and Tilsit have constantly been in close relationship with the German people. A 700 year-old history has moulded the inner sympathies of the majority of the races living there in a European direction, and has added this region to the living space of Greater Germany.

The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and White Russia (last 2 words added in pencil) must be to strive to achieve the form of a German Protectorate, and then transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by germanising racially possible elements, colonising Germanic races and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea under the guardianship of Greater Germany.

For certain cattle-raising products, the Baltic region was a land of surplus, and the Reich Commissar must endeavour to make this surplus once more available to the German people, and, if possible, to increase it. With regard to the process of germanising or resettling, the Esthonian people are strongly germanised to the extent of 50% by Danish, German and Swedish blood and can be considered as a kindred nation. In Latvia, the section capable of being assimilated is considerably smaller that in Esthonia. In this country, stronger resistance will have to be reckoned with, and banishment on a larger scale will have to be envisaged. A similar development may have to be reckoned with in Lithuania, for here too the emigration of racial Germans is called for in order to promote very intensive Germanisation (on the East Prussian border).

White Russia is directly joined to these three territories. For a long time, White Russia had a strong Separatist movement, but presumably Bolshevism has succeeded in suppressing it. In any case, White Russia will first of all have the difficult task of admitting some of those elements who are expelled from Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania and from the Polish section of the Warthe territory. It seems expedient not to accomodate the Poles in the Generalgouvernement, but in the East of White Russia (Smolensk District) and to form there a buffer against Russianism. In addition, the Commissar-General in White Russia would have the task of rousing this country, which cannot be considered as a land of surplus, to productive activity by employment of labour on a vast scale. /

/ Every autonomous White Russian awareness against Russia is to be encouraged. (Marginal note in pencil)

The task of a Reich Commissar with his seat of office in Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one. A country which 700 years ago was captured by German Knights, built up by the Hanseatic league, and by reason of a constant influx of German blood, together with Swedish elements, was a predominantly Germanised land, is to be established as a mighty German borderland. The preliminary cultural conditions are available everywhere, and the German Reich will be able to guarantee the right to a later emigration to all those who have distinguished themselves in this war, to the descendants of those who gave their lives during the war, and also to all who fought in the Baltic campaign, never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of despair and delivered Baltic civilisation from Bolshevism.

For the rest, the solution of the colonisation problem is not a Baltic question, but one which concerns Greater Germany, and it must be settled on ~~these lines~~

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H1124 – 0079

The Reich Commissar, together with the other Reich Commissars, must strive to introduce the improvement of water-way communication between the Black Sea and the Baltic, i.e. start the construction of the Dnieper Canal. In this way the circulation of a great European economic system can be completed, which will guarantee the future exchange of goods, and render it independent of any overseas blockade. Thus the Reich Commissar in the Baltic lands will have great problems to solve in the realm of economics, and particularly in the domain of racial politics.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1029-PS

31 October 1945

I, PETER FRASER, Capt., K.R.R.C., 76538, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 1029-PS.

PETER FRASER
Capt., K.R.R.C.
76538

1029 PS

Exhibit U.S.A. 144

Filed Dec. 10, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1030-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

8th May 41

General Instructions for all Reichcommisars in the occupied Eastern Territories.

The contingency, that the German Reich may find herself confronted by Soviet Russian policy of aggression and of anti-German alliances, makes it obligatory to have a clear conception about the political aims of a German counterblow.

. . . . . .

The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the German Reich from Pan-Slavic (grossrussisch) pressure for centuries to come. This does not only correspond with German interests, but also with historical justice, for Russian Imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy of conquest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it threatened Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great Russian Empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today. This has been done on the part of the National Socialist movement to correspond to the Leader's political testament as laid down in his book, that now the military and political threat, from the East shall be eliminated forever.

Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical and racial conditions into Reichs-Commissariats, each of which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reich Commissariat Eastland (Ostland) including White-Ruthenia will have the task, to prepare, by way of development into a Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an independent state in alliance with Germany and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern Territories a Federal State with a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future. These general viewpoints are explained in the following instructions for each Reich Commissar. Beyond that there are still a few general considerations which possess validity for all Reich Commissars.

As far as currency policy is concerned, a transitional state similar to that in other occupied territories shall be provided for, but with an early beginning of a new orientation, which has to correspond to the political goal to be achieved. In the Reich Commissariat Eastland (Ostland), we will have to introduce as currency German marks, in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine a national "KARBOWANEZ" currency (Ukrainian National bank), in the Reich Commissariat Caucasia a national currency too for the future Federal State.

The German people has achieved, in course of centuries, tremendous accomplishments in the Eastern European area. Nearly its entire real estate property was confiscated without indemnification, hundreds of thousands (in the South, on the Volga) starved or were deported or, like in the Baltic territories, were cheated out of the fruits of their cultural work during the past 700 years. The German Reich will now have to proclaim the principle, that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories, the former German assets have become property of the people of Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former individual proprietors where the German Reich may reserve the right (assuming that it has not already been done during resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of compensation and restitution of this national property, will be subject to different treatment by each Reich Commissariat.

The moment for declarations of this kind will be determined by the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern territories. (This sentence was added in pencil).

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From the point of view of cultural policy, the German Reich is in a position to promote and direct national culture and science in many fields. It will be necessary, that in some territories an uprooting and resettlement of various racial stocks (Völkerschaften) will have to be effected.

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1030-PS

26 November 1945

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/Sgt., AUS, 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 1030-PS.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/Sgt., 33799122

H1124-0081

1030 PS

Exhibit U.S.A. 146
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1039-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

- I -

Report
on the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Questions

==========

Immediately after the notification of individual Supreme Reich offices regarding the Fuehrer's decree of 20. 4. 1941 a conference with the chief of the OKW (armed forces high command) took place. After presentation of the various political aims in the proposed Reichskommissariats and presentation of personal requirements for the East, the chief of the OKW explained that a deferment (OK-stellung) would be too complicated in this case and that this matter could be carried out best by direct cancellation (Abkommandierung) by command of the chief of the OKW Generalfeldmarschall Keitel Then issued an appropriate command which established the basis for the coming requirements. He named as deputy and liaison officer general Jodl and Maj. Gen. Warlimont. The negotiations which then commenced relative in all questions of the Eastern Territory were carried on by the gentlemen of the OKW in collaboration with officials of my office. A conferencetook place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that under the given confidential circumstances my office could in no way deal with any representatives of the people of the East - European area. I asked him to do this insofar as the military intelligence required it, and then to name persons to me who could count as political personalities over and above the military intelligence in order to arrange for their eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that naturally also my wish not to recognize any political groups among the emigrants would be considered by him and that he was planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.

Later on I informed Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the Supreme commander of the Army, respectively to the chief quartermaster and to the army groups for questions relative to political configuration and requests of the OKW. In the meantime this has been done.

Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister of Economy (Reichswirtschaftsminister) Funk, who appointed as his permanent deputy Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily conferences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to the war economic intentions of the Economic Operational Staff (Wirtschaftsführungsstab) East. In this connection I had conferences with General Thomas, State Secretary (Staatssekretär) Koerner, State Secretary Backe, Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert and others. Far-reaching agreement was reached in the easter questions as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A few problems regarding the relationship of the proposed Reich ministry toward the four-year plan are still open and will be subject, after submission, to a decision of the Fuehrer. In principle I declared that I in no way intended to found an economic department in my office, economics would rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reichsmarschall and the persons appointed by him, however the two responsible department heads, namely Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for industrial economics and Ministerial Director Riecke for food economics, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men, to coordinate here political aims with the economic necessities, in a department which would have to unite yet other persons for such coordinating work, depending on later and for work (political leadership of labor unions, construction etc.)

1039-PS

H1124-0082

H1124-0083

After notification of the Reich foreign minister, the latter appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to my office. For the requested representation in the political department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Scibbrandt) the foreign ministry released General Counsel Dr. Brautigam, who is known to me for for many years, speaks Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations wich if necessary will be placed before the Führer are under way with the foreign office regarding its wishes for the assignment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners.

The propaganda ministry appointed State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a complete agreement was reached to the effect that the decisions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations, etc. would be made in my office; a great number of substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the papers prepared by the propaganda ministry would be modified here if necessary. The whole practical employment of propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda. For the sake of closer cooperation the propaganda ministry assigns yet another person directly to my department "Enlightenment and Press" (Aufklärung und Presse) and in addition appoints a permanent press liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some time, and without attracting attention to my office in any way, this agreement on contents and terminology takes place continually every day.

Thorough discussions took place with Reichsminister Ohnesorge concerning future transmission of communication and setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied territories; with Reichsminister Seldte on the supply of labor forces, with Reichsminister Frick (State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commissariats. According to the present estimate there will be four Reichs Kommissariats, as approved by the Führer. I shall propose to the Führer for political and other reasons to set up a suitable number of General Commissariats (24) Main Commissariats (about 80) and Regional (Gebiet) Commissariats (over 900). A General Commissariat would correspond to a former Generalgovernment, a Main Commissariat to a Main-Government. A Regional Commissariat contains 3 or 4 Districts (Kreise). In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum number which appears necessary for a future civil government and/or administration. A portion of the officials has already been requested on the basis of the above named command of the Chief of the OKW.

In the same manner conferences have taken place with the Reich Physicians Leader (Reichsärzteführer) Dr. Conti, the Inspector of the Army Veterinary Service, and all specialists belonging thereto. The difficulties of medical and veterinary supply were thoroughly discussed and the measures were previewed, in order to insure well-prepared employment of the forces mentioned after the end of the operations. A conference with Reichsminister Dr. Todt resulted in the assignment first of all of 4 higher leaders of the Construction Service, whereupon Dr. Todt proposed to unite administratively under one leadership the whole Construction Service.

Discussions took place with Reich Leader Amann and his chief of staff Rienhardt regarding the publication of four German newspapers in the Reich Commissariats to start with. Furthermore a number of newspapers in the prospective native tongues were considered. According to the latest information the technical forces, for this work are already at the border and may be committed at any time to determine whether the prerequisites for printing shops are present.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1039-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

H1124-0084

Discussions are also under way with Corpsleader (Korpsfuehrer) Huehnlein and with the Reich youth leadership to assure a necessary and suitable mobolization. Intensive talks also took place with the Chief of Staff (Stabschef) of the SA. He was asked to make available a number of the most reliable SA leaders for this gigantic territorry, which he agreed to do. The personnel suggestions together with other suggestions will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The same agreement has been reached with the Reich organizational leader (Reichsorganisationsleiter), who has instructed the commander of Krossinsee, Gohdes, to carry out the swelling channelling of requested persons, to admit them into Krossinsee for schooling and instruction on the whole problem and prepare them in the best manner for commitment. On the orders of Dr. Ley party member Herrenbach was then employed in order to take over already now the leadership of Russian labor unions in conjunction with the Wehrmacht. That appeared as an eminently important problem, particularly also in connection with the economic leadership, because the labor unions undoubtedly have been a powerful support of the Soviets and especially have the commitment of the German Labor Front appeared necessary under certain conditions.

Lengthly discussions regarding the relationship of the Police to the new order in the East have taken place. Certain proposed changes thereto have been suggested by the Reichsfuehrer SS and on his order by Gruppenfuehrer (SS Lt Gen) Heydrich which do not appear supportable to me for the complete authority of the German Reich government in the East. Also the documents of this problem will have to be laid before the Fuehrer for decision.

Aside from these negotiations I received the responsible deputies of the entire propaganda, namely Ministerial Director Fritsche, Ambassador Schmidt, Reich Superintendent of Broadcasting Glasmeier, Dr. Grothe OKW, and others. Without going into details of political objectives I instructed the above-named persons in confidence about the necessary attitude, with the request to tone down the whole terminology of the press, without issuing any statements.

The works for substantial coverage of the Eastern question prepared long ago appeared in my office, which I turned over to the propaganda deputies. I enclose a few samples thereof. These pamphlets, which may later be turned over to the press for development, deal with the whole structure and organization of the USSR, the economic possibilities of the East, Agriculture, the peoples of the Soviet Union, the work of the Komintern since 1889, the Jews in the Soviet Union since 1933, Statistical results of the poll taken among the Germans in Russia, the history of the Ukraine, of the Caucasus, of Turkestan, Extensive works are in preparation for the foundation of legal administration: German law in the Ukraine, German art in the Ukraine influence of the German language on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainians from the viewpoint of the Germans. In addition a number of articles are being prepared in Russian language which have the purpose of enlightening the people of the Soviet Union about true conditions in Germany. These articles are also suitable as the basis for newspaper articles in the newly occupied territories. Finally, after extensive work, an ethnological map of the East based on the most recent statistical reports has been printed in great number and made available to all offices. This map can be used as the basis of eventual fixing of boundaries in the north as well as in the south, and offers points of departure for fixing the boundaries of the future Reich Commissariats.

As a result of these conferences, conducted for the most part by myself, continuous consultation and organizational preparation is under way through my office and through those of the liaison men delegated from the other offices of the Party and

1039-PS

the State.

I may say that all the work, inasmuch as it is at-all possible under present condition, is in full swing. Aside from the General- and Chief commissariats more than 200 Regional Commissariats are planned, which must all be manned by political leaders, representatives of the department and officials of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The work in the East differs basically from the conditions in the West. Whereas we can count on every technical installation and a cultured population here in the big cities, that is not the case in the East. There literally everything will have to be prepared and taken along, additionally for the gigantic spaces - not only an auto park but a great number of typewriters, office material, above all medical supplies and much more down to the bed sheets. It does not appear possible to accomplish such a project suddenly in I4 days, therefor all these arrangements had to be set in full motion already now on my responsibility on the basis of the Fuehrer's decree.

The structure of my office itself is temporarily organized as follows in carrying out the Fuehrer's order. I have requested Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Dr. Meyer as my permanent representative. He has negotiated personally and thoroughly, throughout the whole time with all pertinent offices, in order to develop all aspects down to the details. A political department has been founded for the execution of the substantical work, under my co-worker of many years Dr. Scibbrandt (deputy General Consul Dr. Trautigam), who prepares the various books and pamphlets for information. A great number of propaganda leaflets have been composed by him which will then have to be scattered over the Russian front in huge numbers by the armed forces. Also for a specific time other leaflets are ready which are addressed directly to the individual races. I do not care to decide on this date for myself, and will lay these originals before the Fuehrer at the first opportunity with the request to check the contents and determine the time of the eventually approved appeals. The political department is also undertaking a thorough investigation of all those, with the exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as advisors for the administration of the various nationalities. Continuous discussions about this subject are under way with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda ministry, etc. Secondly a department of economic - political cooperation has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter Mallotke. A department of "Law, Finance, and Administration" has been taken over by Reichsstatthalter Runte. A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied since the development of this question does not appear urgent. Also the department "Enlightenment and Press". It is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy Johannes Hermann. Integrated here are co-workers who command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The wishes of the Reich Press Chief (Reichspressechef) for setting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar are under discussion in order to decide them in that sense if possible.

Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer for reaching preparations, up to those points of special and personal nature which the Fuehrer alone can decide.

CERTIFIC'TE OF TR'NSL'TION
OF DOCUMENT NO. I039-PS 9. November I945

I, WOLFG'NG E. THORM'NN, M/SGT. 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document I039-PS

WOLFG'NG E. THORM'NN
M/SGT. 33779426

1039PS

H1124-0085

Exhibit U.S.A. 147
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1058-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Extract from a speech of Reichsleiter Rosenberg before the closest participants in the problem of the East, on 20 June, 1941.

- -

The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus-territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there(Wagen Factories etc.) The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means nggative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation in consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200 years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but these talents are different from those of the Western people. The fight between Turgenjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the nation. The Russian soul found no outlet, either way. If we now close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they belong. A historian will maybe see this decision in a different light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian today.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1058-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document number 1058-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67.

H1124-0086

1058 PS

Exhibit USA. 141
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1157 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

RM I c.

Top Secret

(Handwritten note:-) 2nd Copy Kapitän Zdd (?) has come back.
3rd destroyed 12 May (initials)
4th Copy to Maj. Gaedke. 16 May Ha.

4 Copies
1st copy

H1124-0087

(illegible notations)

Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces
at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941

I.

Welcome

Purpose of meeting:- introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of the action.

Barbarossa - Oldenburg.

As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand of all economic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.

The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office (Chef Wi RÜ Amt).

Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is the

Economic Staff Oldenburg for special duties

under the command of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert.

His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:

5 economic inspectorates
23 economic commands and
12 sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.

These offices are used in the

military rear area;

the idea is that in the territory of each Army Group, an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.

A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last we economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the battle area, he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.

In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarter commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country's resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.

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While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.

The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises the entire economic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands etc.

This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg down to the economic commands, requires a standard sub-division into three large groups, i.e.

Group M

dealing with

troops' requirements,

armaments,

industrial transport organization

Group L

which concerns itself with all questions of food and agriculture, and

Group W

which is in charge of the entire field of

trade and industry, including raw materials and suppliers,

further

questions of forestay,
finance and banking,
enemy property,
commerce and exchange of commodities
and manpower allocation.

Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken.

Before giving further details of the particulars of organization and staffing of Group M, of which we have to take charge, here is a short summary on the planned

II.

Local Sub-Division

(Map already handed over) may entries explain code-names.
Of the 5 inspectorates, 4 have been established from the outset, while the 5th remains in reserve for an assignment temporarily undecided.

1.) Leningrad (Holstein)
with economic commands at

Vilna
Riga
Reval
Leningrad
Murmansk

and sub-offices at

Wologda
Archangel.

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2.) Moscow (Saxony)
with economic commands at

Minsk
Moscow
Tula
Gorki

and sub-offices at

Briansk
Jaroslawl
Rybinsk

3.) Kiev (Baden)
with economic commands at

Lddz
Kiev
Kishinev
Odessa
Charkov
Knjepropetrovsk
Stalino
Rostov
Stalingrad

and sub-offices at

Sevastopol
Kerch
Voronesh
Kursk

Finally

4.) Baku (Westphalia)
with economic commands at

Krasnodar
Grozny
Tiflis
Baku

and a sub-office at

Batum.

Besides the 5th inspectorate, with the code-name of Hesse, an economic command (Borkum) and 2 sub-offices are held in reserve.

III.

The question is now how best to take into account local and technical requirements in staffing the individual offices.

In the Economic Staff Oldenburg and in the economic inspectorates, which in all essentials have the same organization, a differentiation according to geographical points of view appears unnecessary, as in each of the gigantic fields of activity every type of question arises and therefore all departments must be staffed.

The gentlemen will therefore find in the strength reports, which are in their hands, both in the Economic Staff Oldenburg and in all economic inspectorates, after each C.O. and his personal assistant a staff group, which in accordance with the scheme submitted to you contains:

the adjutants's office,
the office for the establishment of the authorities,
counter-intelligence
signals and communications,
command of the staff quartermaster,
messing officer and
interpreter.

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In the same manner, Group M is to be staffed uniformly with all branches of the armed forces (army, navy, air, administration) and the transport, technical, general and military supplies divisions. It is impossible to effect any economics here.

Economic commands also start from the common denominator of an normal strength which is likewise submitted to you. It is however neither necessary nor desirable to fill it in all economic commands to the full extent or in an equal measure; the decisive factors here are the individual peculiarities of the various regions.

In all economic commands, the posts in the staff group, transport, technical and general offices will have to be filled. But whether the individual branches of the armed forces will to be represented in the respective economic command will depend essentially on whether the branch of the armed forces in question has any interests of any significance to look after in the territory.

It must be borne in mind thatthe whole organization requires a gigantic staff apparatus and that, in view of the general lack of qualified personnel, only such posts can be filled as are justified by practical necessity.

The branches of the armed forces will therefore have to decide in which of the 23 economic commands they wish to be represented. To fill all 4 offices of army, navy, air and administration will be necessary only in a few centrally situated spots. If on the other hand in some cases all branches of the armed forces require no representation, we would substitute for the planned division into 4 parts, a joint office for armament industry and staff it from the Office of Industrial Armament.

In the interests of speed - the establishment has to be completed by the 15th May - we have to request the branches of the armed forces to communicate their decision to the Office of Industrial Armament by Friday 2nd May.

In order to prepare to a large extent and to facilitate this decision, Captain (Cav.) Jonas, who has a profound knowledge in this field, has compiled a list, on which after the name of each economic command he has indicated by means of the initial of the branch of the armed forces in question which of these branches is in his opinion likely ... represent ...by an office.

The material has been submitted to you in the form of the lengthy treatises., in particular in the form of the economic map and the list showing all firms which are important from the point of view of industrial armaments. In order, however, to assist the gentlemen to form their own opinion in the short time at our disposal, Captain (Cav) Jonas will now illustrate the peculiarities of the differenct areas in the field of industrial armament by means of a short lecture:-

Lecture Captain (Cav.) J o n a s .

Further Points to be discussed

a) In the interests of staff economy, we want to staff some of the above-mentione authorities by enlisting personnel from authorities already existing in occupied territories, e.g. the Moscow Economic Inspectorate is to be staffed by the armamen industry office (Rü In A) to be withdrawn from France.
Murmansk Economic Command is to be staffed from Norway
Moscow Economic Command by Troppau Armament Command
Lodz Economic Command by Radom Armament Command
Sevastopol Sub-Office by Aarhus Sub-Office.
Even though these units will have to be brought up to the required strength and supplemented, their employment at least creates a basis and thus effects a considerable economy in staff.

b) Which members of branches of the armed forces are already earmarked for Rü VI?
c) In which economic commands are the commander or for instance the head of the transport office to be appointed from the members of a branch of the armed forces which has an overriding interest?

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H1124 - 0091

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1157 PS

11 November 1945

I, PFC ERNST W. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1157 PS.

ERNST W. COHN,
PFC
33925738.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1229-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 130
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TOP SECRET

(stampdd) (illegible pencil mark)

Supreme command of the Armed Forces
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)
Armed forces Fuehrer Staff (WFST)/
/department (Abt.) L number 33 264/40
top secret, for general officers only. (Chefs)

Fuehrer headquarters, September 6, 1940.

73 (in pencil) (illegible pencil mark)

7 copies
4th copy
(in pencil)

SUBJECT: Material for the intelligence service
(Unterlagen fuer den Nachrichtendienst)
SUBJECT: Counter intelligence (Abw.) III
number 398/40 top secret of August 26 1940.
OKH General Staff of the Army (Gen. St.d.H.)
operational department Ia number 150231/40
top secret of September 2, 1940.

TO : Counter intelligence service abroad
(Ausl./Abw.)

The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.

These regroupings mustnot create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will realise that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protektorat; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests - espec. on the Balkan - with strong forces against Russian seizure.

For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply:

1.) The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there. this change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings.

2.) The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernment, in the Protektorat and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively unimportant.

3.) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, espec. of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.

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1229 PS

H1124 - 0093

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1229-PS
Cont'd

4.) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets.

5.) Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes etc. it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.

The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i. e. numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons etc. will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage.

The chief of the supreme command of the armed forces

by order of

signed JODL

A certified copy
F.N.(in pencil)
Captain

Distribution:

Counter intelligence service abroad (Ausl.-Abw.)
1st copy (with map)
Supreme command of the Army (Ob.d.H.) (Operational department)
2nd copy
Supreme command of the Airforce (Ob.d.L.) Fuehrer department)
3rd copy
Supreme command of the armed forces (OKW):

Armed forces Fuehrer staff (WFST) 4th copy
Department L
Chef, IH, IL 5th-7th copies

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1229-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., 01335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1229-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
01335567

1229-PS

H1124 - 0094

Exhibit U.S.A. 140
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1317-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Rü Ic

Berlin, March 1, 1941

Re: Oldenburg (stamp) TOP SECRET

5 copies
1st copy

Memorandum

Conference at Office Chief, General of the Infantry Thomas on February 28, 1941

Present: General of the Infantry Thomas
Colonel Becht
Lt. Col. Luther
Lt. Col. Matzky
Major von Gusovius
Major von Payr
Major Huch
Captain Emmerich
Captain Dr. Hamann

The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal.
Essential Points:

1) The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan.
2) The organization must include everything concerning war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission of State Secretary Backe.
3) Clear statement that the organization is to be independent of the military or civil administration. Close cooperation, but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.
4) Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:
   a) Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important goods.
   b) Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically complimentary districts

   (notation on bottom of page 1:) BDC GOTHA Old II.

5) In view of the extended field of activity, the term war economy inspection is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection.
6) In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous. The main mission of the organization will consist of seizing raw materials and taking over all important concerns. For the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their experiences. (for example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).

After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within one week.

Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is essential. An Officer must still be appointed for Wi. and Ro, with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.

Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half of next week. Also, the 4 officers who are ordered to draw up the individual

1317-PS

H1124 - 0095

armament inspections are to report to the Office Chief at the end of next week.

(signed:)
Hamann

Distribution:

Staff	1st Copy
Rü	2nd Copy
Lt.Col. Luther	3rd Copy
Planning	4th Copy
Supply	5th Copy

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1317-PS

7 November 1945.

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st Lt, ORD, O-1558904, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1317-PS.

WALTER R. SELIGSON
1st Lt, ORD
O-1558904.

1317 PS

H1124 - 0096

Exhibit USA 148
Filed Dec. 10, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1456-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Chief of Agency for
Armament Economy
(Chef Wi-Rue Amt)

Berlin, 20 June 1941

Colonel Jansen

MEMORANDUM

Following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel:

Par. I

The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarkical endeavors. It is impossible, to try and manufacture everything we lack, by synthetic procedures or other measures. For instance, it is impossible, to develop our motor fuel economy to a point wherewe can entirely depend on it. All these autarkical endeavors ask for a tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs, one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the runningof the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war economy, by conquering them.

At the time the 4-Year-Plan was established, I issued the statement where I made it clear that a completely autarkical economy is impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great.Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves for missing stocks resp. to secure the delivery in wartime through economic alliances.

Par. II

In a conference between Todt - Pleiger - Thomas, it was determined:

Matter: "Detailed orders to the mining industries".

Par. III

Todt suggests the construction of heavy special machinery at Krupp's and Skoda's.

(Signed) THOMAS

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1456 PS

H1124-0097

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1456-PS
(Continue)

PARTIAL CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1456-PS

I, Paul W. FREEDMAN, S/SGT. 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1456-PS.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/SGT.
33799122

1456 PS

H1124 - 0098

Exhibit U.S.A. 131
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPT OF DOC. 1799-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

A N N E X 1

Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.

* * * * * * * * *

The fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.

The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.

* * * * * * * * *

It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130 - 140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.

(Source: L/K.T.B. OKW Volume 6 a

1 August 1940 - March 26, 1941

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT OF DOC. 1799-PS

- - - - - - - - - - - -

6 November 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR 391590 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpt of Document 1799-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT (jg) USNR
391590

1799-PS

Exhibit U.S.A 829
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

FOREIGN OFFICE
RAM NO. 56/R

Berlin, 2 March 1941
Strictly secret

Personal

In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.

signed:

Ribbentrop

To: The German Embassy in
Ankara
Madrid
Moscow
Rome (Quir.)
Rome (Vat;)

The German Legation in
Athens
Belgrade
Bern
Budapest
Bukarest
Helsinki
Lisbon
Pressburg (Bratislava)
Sofia
Stockholm

one each

65215

1834-PS

H1124 – 0099

Enclosure
To RAM No. 56/R

Strictly secret

Extract

from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.

After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the RAM,) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.

Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia - a necessity for avoiding a two - front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German - Japanese relationship. Now the German - Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

* * * * *

As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hoped to destroy very much more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. When we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further developments.

At sea the commitment of the U - boat weapon had thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.

Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this

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impossible. In East Asia America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible but Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. It adds up for practical purposes to the creation of American air bases in England. But in an air war we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks on Europe and thereby split up its forces. In an air duel - Europe vs. England - Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers..

The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English - American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.

Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won to-day militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:

1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.

2) A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.

3) In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.

The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that

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America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan's entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press, radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.

Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.

Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feeling against America had risen considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.A., concerning Japan's attitude in case of America's entry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the U.S.A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for the American people, but that should the U.S.A. have any aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy propaganda.

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The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other had, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). Enland too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.

Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.

The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U. S. A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U. S. A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1834-PS

November 28, 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document 1834-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

H1124-0103

1834-PS

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit USA 35
Filed Dec. 7, 1945
Original heretofore
marked for identification
only.

BASIC FACTS

FOR A

HISTORY OF GERMAN

WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY

H1124-0104

H1124-0105

Page 35

IV

The influence of central organization on development and activities of the war economy organization

Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activities of the war economy organization to such an extent, that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail.

The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the Supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war, prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the national socialists came into power and especially by the decease of Reichpresident von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law (see Appendix IV, 1) fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization.

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Page 135

XV

War and Armament Economic Measures from entry into Austria (1938 till mobilization (1939)

The discussion between the Führer and the Austrian Chancellor of State Schuschnigg on February 12, led to the military-political measures against Austria, which concluded with the entry into Austria on March 13. This action against Austria, disguised under the code name "Action Otto" prepared in a short time, has resulted in a wealth of experience of utmost importance, for the preparation of mobilization and especially for the economic preparations, and has in the course of the year led to changes in the regulations regarding mobilization.

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Page 136

The action was prepared and started without the cooperation of the WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great confusion in the economic sphere leading to unpleasant conditions for the army and also for the economy for the time being.

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Page 141

The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to issue new regulations, preparing the separating of the mobilization of the Armed Forces from the mobilization of the civilian elements. Mobilization of the Armed Forces without public announcement (X-case) was prepared, nevertheless there should be the possibility of proceeding at any time from the mobilization of the Armed Forces only, to a general mobilization of State, Nation and Economy. The basic idea is, that all actions and regulations in case-X are based on Civil law, a state of defense has not been declared and martial law has not been proclaimed. The appropriate measures were ordered on July 5 by the OKW. WStb and GBW expressed justifiable misgivings regarding these new regulations, as mobilization of the Armed Forces before mobilization of economy would create

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H1124-0106

Page 141 (cont.)

considerable confusion and endanger the smooth running of the economic mobilization. On the demand for a divided mobilization was necessary from a military-political point of view, it was accepted in spite of the objections of the WStb and GBW.

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Pages 142-143

The first planned action by the war economy organization during an actual operation was at the time of the entry into the Sudeten territory. Liaison officers of the OKW (WStb) were attached to the corpscommandos, they were in charge of technical war economy units and finally, War Economy Offices for special missions were created to take over definite Economic departments. The military-political developments during the occupation of the Sudeten German territory evolved in such a manner, that the liaison officers as well as the technical war economy units and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations. Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the installation of the liaison officers of the OKW (WStb) at the corpcommandos is of great value not only to the troops but also for OKW, and is a necessity in modern warfare. This proved especially valuable insofar, as the chief of the Civil government, were as a rule not instructed in their duties and authority, and the offices for special missions, first had to give them the necessary directives for their task.

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At the beginning of the year 1939 a new level was reached as regards the military-political situation - the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the German army and the abrogation of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.- These operations also were prepared "war economically" by the creation of war economy units, who had, as in the case Sudetenland, a very small scope for action. Immediately after the occupation, a war economy inspectorate for special missions was set up, which took over all the duties of the Czechoslovak secretaryship general for National Defense and which was transformed into the Inspectorate of War Economy Prague on March 30, 1939 already. The main duties of the Inspectorate are:

Utilization of the total industrial economy of the Protectorate for the purpose of Reichdefense;

control of manufacture of war material for at home and abroad and

Effect synchronization of demands to be made by military and civilian Reich authorities and the industrial economy of the Protectorate.

Furthermore they are assigned:

the instruction of the Reichprotector on the economic demands to be made in the interest of Reichdefense and to advise him concerning legislation resulting therefrom;

air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the Defence Measures (Abwehrmassnahmen) in the factories.

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H1124-0107

Pages 181 - 184 XVIII

Execution of the economic mobilization

Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization I regard it as my duty, to give my opinion on the possibility of successful warfare as regards war economy, from my experience as Chief of the WStb gained during August 1939. During this time many conferences were held with the then Generaloberst Keitel discussing our readiness for war and conditions in regard to armaments as compared with that of the prospective enemy states. During all these discussions I maintained the point of view, that a war with Poland would present no problem for us, but that for a great world war of long duration, our economic structure would be too weak and that, in the case of a world war, decisive measures, conforming to a total war, would have to be carried out immediately. These objections and the resulting demands were nevertheless ignored.

The process of German mobilization in 1939 was most intensively influenced by the progress of the military-political situation and was carried out with the idea of surprising the enemy, at the right moment. The experience gained during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, which led to separate and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis for the measures to be taken. The tension, existing between Germany and Poland since July, was used to take all the measures, necessary for a surprise attack on Poland. Some of these preparations as far as war economy was concerned were the acceleration of the delivery of armaments, which in particular was carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces and, for the organization of War-economy, the forming of war economy units to be attached to the attacking armies.

After August 1, the formation and distribution of VO of WStb took place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In this manner the form of mobilization was ordered, which represented the most unfavorable form for the mobilization of war economy. Reiterated objections against divided mobilization, submitted by WStb as late as August 24, were overidden by the Chief of OKW, while the Supreme Command was of the opinion, that a war with Poland did not necessitate a General mobilization, and any other form of mobilization was out of question for political reasons.

On August 25 18.30 a copy of case X was remitted to the inspectorates of War economy (copy, see Appendix XVIII, 3).

The decree of August 25 orders expressly that case X shall not be extended in its entirety to civilian matters. Even though it was ordered that future proposed mob measures must not be endangered by unplanned demands, requisitions and commandeerings, there was still considerable danger in the mobilization being divided and carried out at different times. This was especially applicable as far as economy was concerned insofar as regulations for economy read that with the utmost consideration of economy in general only the most important war factories should be maintained at their former level and that only isolated war factories should be immediately speeded up to produce a large output. These regulations, in consideration of the Economic Policy which was to oppose every unnecessary change, and also of the kind of propaganda adopted were bound to endanger the planned process of economic mobilization.

The preparations, covering many years of work, for the mobilization of Economy were consequently, for the most part, invalid. This regulation was unfortunately to become an inconvenience later on when starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even noticeable for the

2353 PS

H1124-0108

Pages 181 - 184 (cont.)

first four years of the war up to the declaration of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the preparation for mobilization of the WStb and invalidated by the above regulation, were not executed until 1943 as a result of demands by the Reichminister for Armaments and ammunition.

On August 27, 1939, the regulation on the administration of economy was issued, whereby the Oberpräsidenten were charged with executing and directing all economic measures of the GBW. Included in this was the official founding of the District Economy offices, the Provincial Food offices (Landesernährungsämter), Offices of forestry and economy of timber (Holzwirtschaftsämter) forming finally the organization, that should have been in force long ago as a result of the mobilization order by GBW.

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B. War Economy

The year 1940 was the first acid test for the value and necessity of the War Economy organization. After it had proved its value at home by the measures taken to strengthen the war economy of Germany especially in reestablishing the German war industry and reconstructing the armament industry and had earned the constant appreciation of Field marshal Goering, and the Reichminister for War, it now remained to prove that the organisation was also able to support the combat troops, to administer the economy of occupied countries and put it into operation again, and that there was an absolute necessity for such an organization in the present war. That this point of view is correct, is proved by the fact, that all allied- as well as enemy states constructed similar organizations, imitating the German pattern.

The operations against Denmark and Norway and the western campaign against Holland, Belgium and France brought full proof; the year 1942 has more than confirmed this point of view.

1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway

The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rü was informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of February, and thereupon ordered the preparation of the measures to be taken as regards war economy. It was decided, that a small staff under the direction of Major Neef (Group leader in the dept. of raw materials Wi Rü) should carry out the appropriate, preliminary preparations, for the organization which were to be carried out in accordance with the directives of OKW-WFA and the Oberquartiermeisters of group XXI charged with the operational preparations. Commander in chief of Group XXI was von Falkenhorst, General in the infantry; Colonel of General staff Baentsch, Oberquartiermeister. The war economy specialists, coordinated under Major Neef, were assimilated into the staff of group XXI on March 20, under the title "Group War Economy" and VO of OKW/Wi Rü office.

The first performance of the group was the compilation of material on the economic structure of Denmark and Norway, Then it worked on the war economy and armament part of the "Demands of OKW to the political plenipotentiaries of the Führer in the Danish and Norwegian Governments", and the economic measures in the "Special instructions on conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway".

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Furthermore, special tasks were given to the war economy officers concerned and their first duties defined as follows:

a). Support of the military commanders in the utilization of the economy of the country in the interest of the armed forces;

b). Identification and safeguarding of supplies against unauthorized seizure or transport;

c). Starting or restarting of production plants;

any further war economy and armament tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW.

The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders, directives and so forth were issued in a special calender in order of mobilization (mobmässig).

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On April 2 it was decided to select April 9 as the day on which the operation should be carried out.

The execution of the operation was on the whole carried out according to plan. Provision was made that the WO should reach their posts together with their respective staffs, namely, Major Neef by air, the WO Esbjerg and Aarhus over-land, the remaining gentlemen in the warships in which the staffs were transported, while all WO, though partly under heavy fighting, reached their objective on April 9, Major Neef was not able to reach Oslo until April 12, because of the opposition near Oslo.

The unified War Economy Organisation which had been prepared for Norway and Denmark depended upon the regulation that the Senior Command for special missions XXXI in Denmark war subordinate to group XXI in Norway. When it soon became evident that this arrangement did not work because of distances and because of the conflicting behavior of the Norwegian and Danish governments, it was decided on April 10 to make the Senior Command for Denmark directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army, while group XXI together with the forces operating in Norway was to remain Subordinate to the OKW. As a result of this change it also became necessary to divide the War Economy organization. The War Economy Liaison Office Denmark was placed under the supervision of the administrator of Danish economy, on the staff of the political plenipotentiary of the Führer in Copenhagen; the organization Norway under Major Neef remained attached to group XXI.

In Norway as well as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work.

As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and the most important military problems had been settled, they quickly attended to the construction of the War Economy Organization.

In Norway for the first few days after the occupation, the German Ambassador Dr. Brüuer , remained the political plenipotentiary of the Führer. As Foreign Office commissioner, dealing with economic problems, Min. Direktor Sarnow of the Reich Wi. M. was attached to him. Major Neef immediately tried to secure a definition of the fields of work. However, ..

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when this did not meet with any success, for the sake of the work, he arranged with Min. Dir. Sarnow that the office of WO Norway as should be incorporated into the Staff of the commissioner dealing with economic problems, as Main Division II. This measure, however, was never carried out, because both Dr. Bräuer and Min. Dir. Sarnow were recalled on April 22 and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP Terboven was named by the Führer as Reichcommissioner of the occupied Norwegian territories. All attempts by Major Neef to clarify the status and spheres of activity with the 2nd in Command of the Reich Commissar Gauwirtschaftsberater Otte, were for the time being unsuccessful. On April 27 the former Liaison Office was changed to the War Economy Staff Norway. The WO as a branch office was subordinate to the latter.

In Denmark, Commander Dr. Forstmann quickly succeeded in coming to an understanding with the German Ambassador von Renthe - Fink and his commercial attaché Dr. Krüger in regard to the spheres of activity. On May 27 the office was renamed "War Economy Staff Denmark."

The details concerning the establishing of the War Economy offices, their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most important experiences during this first large-scale operation of the War Economy Organization.

The problems which faced the war economy officers during the occupation of Denmark and Norway were very extensive and embraced both military as well as economic problems in all fields of economy. The military leaders were glad that officers trained in war economy were at their disposal, who were qualified to solve questions of an economic-organizational character and, as authorities, could negotiate with Danish and Norwegian Officials. At this moment the manner in which the War Economy Organization had been formed, proved its worth in that there was personnel trained in military as well as industrial and commercial fields. Thus it happened that problems were entrusted to the WO which really lay beyond the scope of their activities. The following may be named:

Supplying troops with food,
Motor vehicles and fuel,

Procuring billetting possibilities for the troops,

Securing money and regulating the currency problem,

Procuring material (cement, wood, etc.),

Providing coal,

Regulating transportation,

Loading troops onto ships,

Procuring raw materials and finished products,

Putting the fishing industry into operation,

Rationing food for the armed forces and the civilian population,

Rationing of fuel,

Cooperating with the sailings of ships putting in and out,

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Administering the loading of ships,

Checking over claims for compensation for war damage and requisitions,

Utilization of fish garbage and the manufacture of fish flour,

Price regulations for the purchase and renting of of real estate for the armed forces,

The loaning of horses and seed for agriculture,

These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or were not in the position to solve these problems.

Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the WO to cope with the real problems affecting war economy, which dealt immediately with the seizing and securing of the most important agricultural supplies and the reestablishing of the means of subsistence.

Then the problems in Denmark and Norway shaped themselves in different ways as a result of the war situation (see appendix XX, 6). As early as June 15 the order could be issued regarding Denmark that the country be treated as being in the domestic theatre of operations; and therefore it was possible to quickly begin to make full use of the Danish defense and armament industry. The exploitation of the armament industry in Norway could only follow at a slower pace and at a later period, because it was regarded as being enemy territory. The utilization of the Danish and Norwegian economy followed within the framework of the "Proposals by the armed forces for the regulating of the general questions in regard to war and armament economy." (see appendix XX, 7).

Very soon it was necessary for the Wi Rü department and the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway to take sharp measures in order to avoid duplication of work and the overlapping of the WT in Danish and Norwegian concerns. Above all, it was important for the sake of currency stabilization to keep a firm hand over the buyers of the WT, because they were causing danger to the currencies of the countries by flooding them with fiduciary monetary tender. It very soon became finally necessary to adopt measures to make the raw material available for those orders placed with Denmark and Norway, because, in part, the raw materials needed for the purpose of filling these orders were not to be had there.

In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into operation again, the Wi Rü Amt. sent German industrial and economic personnel to Norway, who, as middle-men, were to quickly establish confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge were to accelerate the revival of Norwegian Economy.

The experiences of the first months of the occupation show that it is absolutely necessary to provide units operating independently with War Economy Offices, since in a modern war economic problems are submitted to the commanders which can only be solved by trained personnel. It is self evident that, later on, a major portion of the problems must be transferred to the civilian Economic departments, which will be set up, and that the soldier confines himself to the solution of economic problems that serve the troops, as long as no solution is found, as later proved to be the case, in the Netherlands.

The staffing of the WO for Denmark and Norway was in most cases too small, because the problems were too complex and the fields of operation

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allotted to them were too large.

Yet it is an established fact that the War Economy Offices, in Denmark and Norway especially, rendered invaluable services to the troops during the first months and that an organization for the reopening of industrial operations and to carry out the commissions of the WT was an absolute necessity;

Moreover, the outstanding work of the War Economy offices in Denmark and Norway was the main reason for the fact that, in 1941, it was possible to carry out, according to plan, the enormous work for the defense of the country, which was required of the Economies of Denmark and Norway by the Supreme Command.

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2. Campaign in the West

The operations against France, Holland and Belgium brought about the first real use of the war economy organization in enemy territory. It was accomplished in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army.

At the start of the war, the Armed Forces operating in the West were, by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland, supplied with Army Economic Officers (Armeewirtschaftsführer))(A. Wi. Fü)* who simultaneously were the liaison with the armament offices in the border territory.

The primary duties of the A Wi Fü attached to the Western armies were the tasks of economic evacuation and immobilization and only at the end of 1939 did the preparations for the entry into Holland, Belgium and France come to the foreground. The process of economic evacuation in the homeland rested mainly with the competent Rü commandos of the homeland, who had arranged the necessary preparations by way of mobilization, in accordance with the clearance measures already/during peacetime.
prepared

Especially in the Saar territory the VO had a complicated task to perform, and was able to demonstrate the value of its existance for defense also.

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Negotiations with friendly and neutral states on war economy and also delivery of war material.

The year 1940 brought special problems for the office of Wi Rü as far as trade in war material was concerned as a result of the deliveries, necessitated by the military political situation, to Russia, Finland, Roumania and Italy.

As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty of August 19, 1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM, 120 millions RM, thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries of material to the value of 500 millions RM were desired during the first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparati etc.

* Their designation first was VO of OKW/Wi Rü office, later changed to Army-Economy Officers.

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could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their request, the preponderant desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of the Russians as much finished war material as possible.

As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons cereals, 500000 tons wheat, 900000 tons of oil by-products, 100000 tons of cotton, 500000 tons phosphates, 80 millions RM of timber, 10000 tons of flax, manganese, platinum and the transit for 1 million tons of Soyabeans), and in consideration of the importance of these quantities to the German war economy and the importance which the Supreme Command attached to the maintaining of pleasant relations with Soviet Russia, the question of immediate reciprocal deliveries became steadily more pressing.

The desire to produce war material became stronger from week to week, so strong that OKW created a special Referat at Wi Rü charged with working on the Russian demands and arranging them in accordance with the German production program. Appendix XX, 21 and XX, 22 gives an idea of the progress of the arrangements.

As the Russians delivered quickly and well, it was imperative to accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command decided, to offer the Russians even more war material, that was already manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was great. The great cruiser Lützow especially came into this category other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery and tanks and important patents (lizenzen) for war material. As these contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the Führer ordered, on March 30, that - as far as necessary - the delivery of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery to the German Armed Forces.

This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position, as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements stepped up and demanded punctual delivery.

On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rü, during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rü to give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy.

By the end of October 1940, Reichmarshal Goering insisted once more, on pressure being exerted for accelerated deliveries to the Russians according to plan. (file notice from Oct. 5, see Appendix XX, 23).

Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way.

The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains.

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The production program ordered by decree of the Führer on Aug. 20, and instituted by reason of urgency, on Sept. 20, was stepped up again

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on Sept. 27, and amended insofar as the equipment under the code word "Achse" (African campaign) was to be given priority over all other equipment, including the ones in the special category.

As both the Army and Minister Todt were urging the high priority of the Panzer - and Achse-program, the Navy demanded its "Seelöwe" - measures accelerated and aerial armaments were being even more intensified, the Chief of Wi Rü office, at a conference of Chiefs of departments, presided over by Fieldmarshal Keitel, pointed to the difficulties of accelerating everthing at the same time, with the bad situation as regards manpower. He demanded once more a clarification of the organization, which was really the most important thing. Resulting from this the following decision was made by the WFSt on Dec. 3.40, enclosed as Appendix XX, 35.

This decision affected future measures as follows:

1). there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of a siege of England,

2). aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for the first time,

3). the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned for the first time, and its postponement to some later date admitted as possible.

Shortly before, - on Nov. 6, 1940 - Reichmarshal Goering, for the first time made a statement to the effect, that we should prepare ourselves for a long war, and therefore planning of raw material should be considered in this perspective. (see file on Report at Beauvais on Nov. 6.40, Appendix XX, 36).

At the beginning of December, instructions were received, that for the time being there was no question of an Invasion of England, and that the "Seelöwe"-preparations should merely be concluded.

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War Economy

The year 1941 was, as far as war economy was concerned, mostly dominated by the preparations, respectively the execution of the action in the Balkans, the war in the East and the war in Africa.

The respective preparations go back to the year 1940. The development of the Italo-Albanian - Greece war, the establishing of a German military mission in Roumania and the possibility of German participation in the Italian war in Africa had led as early as August 1940 to a War Economy Staff Roumania and in October a War Economy Staff Africa being created by the office of Wi Rü, to deal with the problems connected with these Theatres of war and charged with working out all the questions appertaining thereto. By the middle of November 1940 Colonel Gen. staff Spalcke was delegated to Roumania as member of the German military mission, and charged with the representation for war economy in the Balkan countries and in Africa and the completion of the necessary basis as regards war economy for an operation were intensively processed in the office of the Wi.Rü.

In November 1940, the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secretaries of state Körner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.

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By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rü at the end of 1940.

The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first ofall the following tasks:

1). Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.

2). Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.

3). Determine the power - and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.

4). Investigation of sources of raw materials and Petroleum (crude oil).

5). Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.

These points were concentrated in one big compilation

"War Economy of the Soviet Union" and illustrated with detailed maps etc.

Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization.

For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.

Simultaneously detailed investigations were made of the situation as regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed later on.

Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war economic nature connected with the Balkans and Africa.

Balkans

While the preparations for the Russian Campaign could be completed as planned, the measures for the action in the Balkans had to be improvisioned on account of the unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak in Yugoslavia. Only Colonel Wendt, as VO was sent to AOK-12 in Roumania at the begin of January as planned, and given charge of T. B. 13. The preparations were arranged for an entry into Greece only. When the revolt in Yugoslavia started, the preparations had to be altered. Department IV of VO AOK-12 was divided, the one half under Colonel Wendt to follow the assault of AOK-12, direction Belgrad, the other half under Captain v. Illberg to accompany the forces attacking towards

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Greece. Half a battalion each of T.B. 13 was put at the disposal of Colonel Wendt and Capt. v. Illberg, respectively.

With the arrival of the second army Col. Foch was installed VO in charge of T. B. 6 and 8. Furthermore he had specialists at his disposal, familiar with the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece. Dr. Pook of the Wi Rü Office was dispatched to manage copper mines at Bor.

Details of operations and results of the war economy units during the action in the Balkans; see report of OKW (Wi Rü Bureau) No. 27438/41 secret, of June 4, 1941, Appendix XXI, 10).

Even during the operations, organization of a War Economy Staff Serbia with a Wi. Commando at Belgrade was ordered, the staff was closely connected with Consul General Neuhausen charged with the Economic Administration of Serbia, by the Reichmarshal.

Also

a). a war economy officer Agram for the territory of Croatia and

b). a Rü-commando Klagenfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11).

The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved much credit for the utilization and securing of the Yugoslavian raw materials, important for German armaments and by organizing the transport of these raw materials. The seizing of the still usable factories in Serbia and Croatia for assimilation into the German Armament Industry had already been started in April (s. Wi Rü Bureau No. 22-261/62 of April 29, 41. Appendix XXI, 12 and XXi, 13) and represented useful support for the W. T. especially for repair work but also for the manufacture of material of all kinds. The concerns processing raw material could be built up in the course of time to form a valuable support for the German war economy, the deliveries of copper, bauxite, tin, chromium, asbestos and mica were of considerable importance.

As the territory of Greece, by order of the Führer (see appendix, Wi Rü Bureau No. 22 263/41 2 of May 29, Appendix XXI, 14) was ceded to the Italians for economic exploitation, war economy offices were only installed in Greece where needed by the Army or for the security of transportation.

There was one Wi Kdo each established in Salonika and Athens. At the same time the confiscation and utilization was ordered of the factories, in the areas of Salonica and Athens occupied by German troops, necessary for war economy and armament (see Wi Rü Bureau, No. 22-263/41 s. file XXI, 15). The factories in Athen were especially important as repair plants for the airforce. But also by the delivery of oil and tobacco to the army and to the homeland the war economy offices rendered considerable service.

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The compilation was the result of the deliberations concerning the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall in November 1940. The Office of Economy and Armament ("Wi Rü Amt") had

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taken pains to give a completely objective picture of the situation regarding Defense and armament economy ("wehr - und Rüstungswirtschaftliche Lage") of the USSR and had held it necessary, to refer to the points which might cause difficulties for a military operation.

The result of this work compiled carefully on the basis of safely proved facts is summed up at the end as follows:

"Any operation leading to the occupation of the European part of USSR (without the Uralterritory), will bring the following results:

I. During the first months Germany will be relieved in the field of nutrition and raw materials, if a quick seizure should succeed in

a). preventing the destruction of stocks (stores; "Vorräte")

b). capturing the mineral oilfields of the Caucasus undestroyed and

c). solving the problem of transportation.

II. For longer duration of the war an effective relief is dependent on the following pre-requisites:

a). in all fields:

1). on the solution of the transportation problem,

2). On the staying ("verbleib"; translator's not: may also mean: "whereabouts") of the people (population and winning them over to collaborate.

b). in the field of agriculture:

1). on preventing destruction of the "M.T.S." and the possibility of replacing their pool of tractors and machines by taking up production again in the USSR.

2). on the possibility of fuel supply.

c). in the industrial field:

1). on the capture of powerworks undestroyed or on their fast restoration.

2). on securing the delivery of raw materials not existing in the European part of the USSR to the industry.

III. The supplying of Germany with India-rubber, tungsten, copper, platinum, tin, asbestos and manil hemp remains unsolved until communication with the Far East will be established.

IV. The territory south of the mouth of Volga and Don inclusive of the Caucasus must be included in the operation. The Caucasian fuel supply is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories.

V. In the field of just the armament-industry it will lead to taking possession of about 75% of the total Russian armament industry and almost 100% of the precision tool-manufactoring and optical industory ("Feinmechanische and potische Industry")

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The USSR will keep about 25% of the mere armament and scarcely 1% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry.

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In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June 1941 the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible, Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rü office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the stanpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since, in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.

As a result of the visit of the Hungarian Minister, Excellence Bartha, the trade in war material with Hungary came once more into the foreground. Above all, the Hungarians demanded German help in equipping their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, search lights, and listening devices, tanks, artillery - and communications equipment, and heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture of gauges and fuzes, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks. The Hungarians were promised help in almost all fields, however, not until the summer of 1942, because it was thought that by this time the campaign in the East would have come to an end. Technical help for the saving of raw material with the issuing of licenses was offered them immediately. The shifting of German orders to Hungary was put into effect.

The negotiations with Roumania and Finnland covered more ground, because both states made considerable demands for the improvement of the equipment of their units designed to fight against Russia. First, of all the Roumanians asked for anti-aircraft equipment, prime movers, and trucks for the motorization and artillery equipment of all kind; moreover, they asked that the artillery and munition orders placed in France and with the Boehler works be executed. The Finns demanded long-range guns, anti-aircraft guns, fuzes, airplanes and help in carrying out motorization. In accordance with the directive from the Führer, the Roumanians were promised help as much as possible, while the Finns were to be put off until later.

When the operations opened in the East, the demands became greater and more urgent; the Finns, especially, called for raw materials and fuel, These demands were met in the case of both these countries as much as possible.

Bulgarian wishes lay, particularly, in the field of motorization and communications and in the delivery of armoured reconnaissance cars and tanks. Only small deliveries could be made; in general the Bulgarians were instructed that, those states which were actually in the battle, must receive first delivery.

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Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey were of special importance. The office of Wi Rü was instructed to specially cultivate these negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chronium. Since the Foreign Office wanted in fall to assure the treaty for deliveries of Turkish chronium for the year 1942/43, more deliveries of war material, which partly constituted former Turkish orders, were promised for 1942.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
NO 2353-PS

15 November 1945

I, EVELYN GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Extracts of Document 2353-PS.

EVELYN GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371

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H1124-0120

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.2718=PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Stab Ia

"Matter for Chief"
2 copies
first copy to files Ia
second copy to General
Schubert

May 2nd, 1941

Memorandum

About the result of to=day discussion with the State Secretaries about Barbarossa.

1.) The war can only be continued if all armed forces are fed by Russia in the third year of war.

2.) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things neces= sary for us.

3.) The seizure and transfer of oil seeds all cakes are most important, grain is only secondary.The armed forces will probably consume the fat and meat which are on hand.

4.) Only those branches of industry are allowed to resume work which are engaged in fields of shortages, for instance

the factories manufacturing means of transportation
the factories in the general field of supply (iron)
the textileworks,
only such armament factories in whose fields a shortage exists in Germany
establishment of repair centers for the troops naturally to a large extent.

5.) Special troops, perhaps the Reich Labor=Service or reserve for= mations of the army must be provided in order to guarantee the se= curity in the vast areas between the main roads.
It is necessary to find out the most important areas which must therefore be protected.

initialled v.G.

lo.November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.2718=PS.

I, Pfc. ERNST M.COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.2718=PS.

ERNST M.COHN
Pfc.
33925738

2718-PS

H1124-0121

[COPY]

Enclosure No.2 to despatch No. 1511 dated October 20, 1939, from the American Embassy, Berlin, Germany.

Source: Reichgesetzblatt II, No.38, of September 30, 1939.

TRANSLATION

Announcement relating to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty

September 25, 1939

On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression treaty was aigned in Moscow by representatives of the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty is published herewith.

The exchange of the documents of ratification took place in Berlin on September 24, 1939. The treaty became effective on August 23, 1939 in accordance with its Article VII.

Berlin, September 25, 1939.

The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs

by Baron von Weizsäcker

Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Government of the German Reich

and

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

directed by the wish to strengthen the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and proceeding upon the basic provisions of the Treaty of Neutrality concluded between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in April 1926, have reached the following agreement:

Article 1

T.C 25.

Article 1

The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any act of violence, any aggressive action, or any attack against one another, whether individually or jointly with other powers.

Article 2

In case one of the contracting parties should become the object of war-like acts on the part of a third power, the other contracting party will not support that third power in any form.

Article 3

The Governments of the two contracting parties will in future remain in contact with each other through continuous consultation in order to inform each other concerning questions affecting their mutual interests.

Article 4

Neither of the two contracting parties will participate in any grouping of powers which is indirectly or directly aimed against the other party.

Article 5

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever, the two parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely by means of friendly exchanges of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions.

Article 6

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years with the provision that unless one of the contracting parties denounces it one year before the end of this period the duration of the validity of this treaty is to be regarded as automatically prolonged for another five years.

Article 7

The present treaty is to be ratified within the shortest possible time. The documents of ratification are to be exchanged in Berlin. The treaty becomes effective immediately upon signature.

Drawn up in duplicate texts in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich

von Ribbentrop

As Plenipotentiary for the Government of the U.S.S.R.

S. Molotov

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